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Abstract 
A general equilibrium model has been constructed in a stochastic endogenous growth 
economy driven by an Itô-Lévy diffusion process. The minimum time to “economic maturity” for 
an underdeveloped economy has been computed both in the preference manifold of the modified 
Ramsey fashion and in that of the modified Radner fashion with its support, i.e., fiscal policies and 
savings strategy, endogenously determined. Furthermore, the effects of different information 
structures to the endogenous time have been thoroughly investigated, and local sensitivity 
analyses of optimal consumption per capita with respect to the initial level of capital stock per 
capita have been smoothly incorporated into the current macroeconomic model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For any underdeveloped economy, like China, both the government and the 
people are motivated to choose appropriate fiscal policies and optimal investment 
strategies, respectively, to make the economy reach its maturity level2 as quickly as 
possible. The state of “economic maturity” can be, in the category of macroeconomics, 
translated into the well-known von Neumann equilibrium (see, Neumann, 1945-1946; 
Kemeny et al, 1956; Howe, 1960; Yano, 1998), “turnpike”3 (e.g., Hicks, 1961; 
Radner, 1961; Morishima, 1961; McKenzie, 1963a, 1963b; Atsumi, 1965; Cass, 1966; 
and Gale, 1967), the Golden Age or modified Golden Age (e.g., Champernowne, 1962; 
Pearce, 1962; Phelps, 1961, 1962, 1965; Samuelson, 1965). And in turn, provided the 
existence of the von Neumann path or the “turnpike” of the economy, the problem 
facing us, including the government and the representative agent, is to choose 
appropriate fiscal policies and savings strategy, respectively, to effectively support the 
convergence of the economical system, thereby implying the economy will spend 
almost all time staying at least in the neighborhood of the von Neumann equilibrium 
or the “turnpike” (see, Cass, 1966; Yano, 1984b; McKenzie (1998) and references 
therein), which indeed represents the maximal and sustainable terminal path level 
(e.g., Kurz, 1965; McKenzie, 1976) of the corresponding economy in the present 
model. 
And the current paper is devoted to confirm the existence of the unique von 
Neumann path or the well-known “turnpike” of an aggregate endogenous growth 
economy equipped with AK production technology (e.g., Barro, 1990; Rebelo, 1991; 
Turnovsky, 2000; Aghion, 2004), in the background of a general equilibrium 
framework. Nonetheless, the major goal of this paper is to explicitly compute the 
minimum time needed to reach the “economic maturity” for an underdeveloped 
economy and in an uncertainty environment. Moreover, it’s easy to notice that our 
                                                        
2 Undoubtedly, it should reflect not only high speed of economic growth but also high quality of economic 
development. More about this topic of growth and development, one can refer to Solow (2003). 
3 Related preferences see, Inada, 1964; Morishima, 1965; Nikaidô, 1964; Tsukui, 1966, 1967; McKenzie, 1982; 
Winter, 1967; Coles, 1985; Yano, 1984a, 1985; Bewley, 1982; Gantz, 1980; Drandakis, 1966; Araujo and 
Scheinkman, 1977; and Joshi, 1997; Dai, 2012. 
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paper is a natural extension of the seminal and interesting paper of Kurz (1965)4, 
where optimal paths of capital accumulation under the minimum time objective are 
thoroughly investigated. It is, nevertheless, worth emphasizing that our results are 
based upon the general equilibrium framework and the minimum time is 
endogenously determined provided the welfare of the representative agent is 
maximized5. 
The advantage of the method used here is that the endogenous time6 or the 
minimum time to “economic maturity” can be explicitly computed 7  in some 
conditions, e.g., when the preference or the criterion of the modified Radner fashion 
(1961) is employed. Noting that the minimum time is endogenously determined, even 
applying economic intuitions, by the optimal savings strategy of the representative 
agent and the optimal taxation policies of the government, which are thoroughly 
explored under different information distributions or information structures, thereby 
implying that the endogenous time can be completely characterized and 
comparatively studied in different information structures, which obviously throws 
new insights into our understanding of the minimum time needed to reach “economic 
maturity” for an underdeveloped economy. 
The current paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model 
and the basic idea behind the macroeconomic model. Section 3 computes the 
endogenous time in preference manifold one. Section 4 computes the endogenous 
time in preference manifold two. Section 5 analyzes the effects of different 
information structures to the corresponding endogenous time. Section 6 gives the 
local sensitivity analyses of the optimal consumption strategy, which supports the 
existence of the endogenous time in section 3, with respect to the initial level of 
capital stock per capita. There is a brief concluding section. All proofs, unless 
otherwise noted in the text, appear in the Appendix. 
                                                        
4 It is regarded as a continuation of Srinivasan's work (1962) in a certain sense. 
5 In other words, pursue of speed of economic growth is based upon the quality of economic development. 
6 In the current paper, we will take no difference between “the endogenous time” and “the minimum time to 
‘economic maturity’”. 
7 That is, a simple formula is supplied for the first time. And also, it is easy to see that the maximal terminal path 
level of capital stock per capita is utility-optimal and simultaneously determined with the endogenous time in the 
present model. 
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2. THE GENERAL MODEL 
2.1. Two Types of Preference Manifolds 
In order to determine the minimum time needed to reach the so-called von 
Neumann path or “economic maturity” for an underdeveloped economy, the following 
two kinds of criterions are naturally and indeed comparatively investigated. 
The first one has been widely employed to prove the well-known turnpike 
theorems, and noting that it is pioneered by Radner (1961), we call it the Radner 
fashion. However, it is worth noting that the discount factor is naturally incorporated 
into the criterion while it is excluded in the seminal paper of Radner, that is, we 
employ the modified Radner fashion in the current paper. Formally, given a 
probability space ( , , )W  , similar to Dai (2012), the corresponding problem can be 
written as, 
( )sup ( )e u crt t
t
t- { <¥}
Î
é ùê úë û 1 , 
where  denotes admissible stopping times, 0 1r< < denotes subjective discount 
factor, c denotes consumption per capita, :u +  is a strictly concave 
instantaneous utility function, and t{ <¥}1 represents the indicator function of 
set ; ( )w t w{ ÎW <¥} . 
The second one has been widely used in studying aggregate economic growth 
and optimal fiscal policies. And the idea is certainly due to Ramsey (1928), who 
studied endogenous saving with this kind of criterion. As a consequence, we call it the 
Ramsey fashion. As usual, and to meet the regular requirements, only finite time 
horizon, endogenously determined, and discounted sum are discussed in the current 
paper, i.e., only the modified Ramsey fashion is considered. Formally, based on the 
same stochastic basis ( , , )W  , the corresponding problem is expressed as, 
( ) ( )
0
sup ( ) ( )te u c t dt e u y
t
r rt
t
t
t- - { <¥}
Î
é ù+ê úê úë ûò 1 , 
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where y denotes national income per capita and other notations are the same as in the 
modified Radner fashion. And it is worth emphasizing that the modified Ramsey 
fashion internally requires perfect foresight of the representative agent. 
REMARK. It is easy to see from our specification that there is a natural one to 
one correspondence between the optimal stopping time and the minimum time needed 
to “economic maturity” for any underdeveloped economy. Accordingly, this 
equivalence reflects the fact that the above two kinds of preference manifolds, i.e., the 
modified Radner fashion and the modified Ramsey fashion, imply different standards 
characterizing the corresponding state of “economic maturity”. Notice that the 
modified Radner fashion reflects some psychological effects that would be called as 
“the peak preference” 8  or its natural correspondence “the Ratchet effect” in 
traditional consumption theory. Consequently, we may claim that the modified Radner 
fashion is much stronger than the the modified Ramsey fashion in certain sense. In 
other words, the modified Radner fashion requires much higher level of standard 
about “economic maturity”. Therefore, the “turnpike” of the modified Radner fashion 
should be located above that of the modified Ramsey fashion for any given economy. 
 
2.2. Computation Algorithm of the Endogenous Time 
As usual, the environment consists of the firm, the representative agent and the 
government. And the firm is, without loss of any generality, assumed to be 
competitive. There are alternative goals for the government, that is, government is 
either motivated to choose taxation policies so as to maximize the welfare of the 
representative agent or directly to minimize the time to “economic maturity”. For the 
representative agent, she will first determines the minimum time to “economic 
maturity” given the taxation policies of the government, then to choose optimal 
savings strategy based upon the objective of discounted sum of future instantaneous 
utility in finite time horizon provided the taxation policies of the government. That is 
                                                        
8 That is, the representative agent pursues the highest level of utility or welfare of any single period. And it is just 
the highest level of the welfare that represents the corresponding state of “economic maturity” in the current 
model. 
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to say, the order of action is like this: the government moves first to choose optimal 
taxation policies, then the representative agent determines the minimum time to 
“economic maturity” or the time horizon based upon the optimal taxation policies, 
and finally, the representative agent chooses optimal savings strategy conditional on 
the optimal taxation policies and the endogenous time horizon representing the 
process leading to “economic maturity”. 
Therefore, based on the backward induction rationality principle in computing 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic game theories, we introduce the 
following computation algorithm of the current model, 
STEP 1: The representative agent chooses optimal savings strategy given the 
taxation policies and the finite time horizon of the program. 
STEP 2: Based on the results of Step 1, the representative agent will determine 
the minimum time to reach “economic maturity” with the criterions introduced in 
section 2.1. 
STEP 3a: If the goal of the government is to choose taxation policies so as to 
maximize the welfare of the representative agent, thus based upon the results of Step 1 
and Step 2, the optimal tax rates are derived. 
STEP 3b: If the goal of the government is to choose taxation policies in order to 
directly minimize the time to “economic maturity” derived in Step 2, then the 
corresponding optimal taxation policies are endogenously determined and hence the 
endogenous time is completely characterized with these optimal tax rates. 
STEP 4: The step is necessary only when Step 3a is chosen. Substituting the 
optimal tax rates into the endogenous time derived in Step 2, and so the minimum time 
to “economic maturity” is finally and completely determined. 
 
3. PREFERENCE MANIFOLD ONE 
3.1. Firm 
In the current paper, we introduce the following Cobb-Douglas type production 
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function9, 
1( ) ( ) ( )pY t G t K t
a a-= , 0 1a< <                                     (1) 
where K denotes the capital stock and pG represents the flow of services from 
government spending10 on the economy’s infrastructure. Particularly, suppose that 
these services are not subject to congestion so that pG is a pure public good. Further to 
put p pG g Y=
11, that is government will claim a fraction, pg , of aggregate outputY , 
for expenditure on infrastructure. And, in particular, to make things easier and without 
loss of any generality, pg will be assumed to be exogenously given
12 
with 0 1pg< < throughout the paper, then the production function in (1) can be 
rewritten as, 
1( ) ( )pY t g K t
a a-= , or 1( ) ( )py t g k t
a a-=                             (1’) 
which reveals that the Cobb-Douglas type function given in (1) rather exhibits AK 
production technology, which indeed enssures ongoing economic growth. Therefore, 
equilibrium wage rate is equal to zero and equilibrium return to capital reads as 
follows, 
1
k pr g
a a-= ,                                                    (2) 
where the depreciation rate is assumed to be zero for the sake of simplicity. 
 
3.2. Representative Agent 
                                                        
9 For simplicity’s sake, endogenous labor supply has been excluded in the present paper. However, it is easy to 
show that endogenous labor supply can be naturally incorporated into the current model, thereby inducing a much 
more complicated model. 
10 Gong and Zou (2002) set up a theoretical model linking the growth rate of the economy to the growth rate and 
volatility of different government expenditures. On a theoretical basis, they found that volatility in government 
spending can be positively or negatively associated with economic growth depending on the intertemporal 
elasticity in consumption. And it follows from our specification of the government spending that the volatility is 
endogenously determined by the unbalanced macro-economy as a whole. That is to say, the volatility of 
government spending is not exogenously given but internally and closely linked to the whole economic body. And 
we argue from the specification that government in reality is indeed deeply involved with the whole economy and 
therefore it itself will unavoidably be affected by the macroeconomic activities. One may certainly exogenously 
add volatility to the government spending, which however will be strongly disagreed by the theory of real business 
cycle (see, Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Long and Plosser, 1983). 
11 This specification follows from Turnovsky (2000). 
12 This in some extent follows from Kydland and Prescott (1977)’s analyses that policymakers should follow rules 
rather than have discretion. 
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It is assumed that the economy consists of ( )L t identical individuals at time t , 
each of whom possesses perfect foresight. Suppose that 0( ) t TB t £ £{ } is a standard 
Brownian motion defined on the following filtered probability 
space ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0( , , , )
B B B B
t t T£ £W { }   with ( ) 0Bt t T£ £{ } the ( )B - augmented filtration 
generated by 0( ) t TB t £ £{ } with
( ) ( )B B
T=  . Furthermore, we assume that a Poisson 
random measure ( , )N dt dz associated with a Lévy process is defined on the stochastic 
basis    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0( , , , )
N N N N
t t T£ £W { }   . And we denote by 
( , ) ( , ) ( )N dt dz N dt dz dz dtn= - the compensated Poisson random measure associated 
with a Lévy process 
00
( ) ( , )
t
t zN ds dzh ò ò with jump measure ( , )N dt dz and Lévy 
measure ( ) ([0,1], )O N On = [ ] for 0( )OÎ B , i.e., O is a Borel set with its 
closure 0OÌ , where 0 -{0}   . In what follows, our reference stochastic basis 
will be 0( , , , )t t T£ £W { }   with ( ) ( )B NW=W ´W , ( ) ( )B N= Ä   , ( ) ( )B Nt t t= Ä    
and ( ) ( )B N= Ä   , and also the underlying probability measure space is assumed to 
satisfy the so-called “usual conditions”13. Based on the above constructions and 
assumptions, we now define14, 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )dL t L t ndt dB t zN dt dzs g- é ù= + +ê úê úë ûò ,                        (3) 
where n denotes the natural growth rate of population, 0s Î is an exogenously given 
constant, 1zg >- a.s. n- , (0) 0B = a.s.- and, 
( , ) ( ) ( , ),               
( , )
( , ),                                                  
N dt dz dz dt N dt dz z Z
N dt dz
N dt dz z Z
nìï - <ïíï ³ïïî
              (4) 
for some [0, ]Z Î ¥ . As usual, we define the following law of motion of capital 
                                                        
13 That is, the probability space is complete and the filtration satisfies right continuity. 
14 It is in line with Merton (1975) that the uncertainty comes from the growth of population. Itô-Lévy process has 
been widely applied in finance, e.g., Yan et al (2000). And here we apply Lévy diffusion to macroeconomics, 
which would be regarded as reasonable via noting the properties of both Lévy diffusions and macroeconomic 
phenomenon. 
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accumulation, 
( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )k k cK t r K t C tm t t= [( - ) -( + ) ]  
    1 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sg g r K t
a am t t-= [( - )-( + )( - - )] ,                     (5) 
where 0mÎ is some exogenously given parameter, kr denotes the equilibrium return 
to capital given in (2), kt denotes tax rate on capital income, ct represents consumption 
tax rate,C denotes aggregate consumption level and sr denotes the savings rate. Hence, 
combining (3) with (5) and by applying Itô formula for Itô-Lévy process, we get, 
{ }1 2( ) 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sdk t g g r n k t dta am t t s- -= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- +  
2( )
1 ( ) ( )
z
zz Z
dz k t dtg g n
-
+<
+ò ( ) ( )k t dB ts --
0
1( ) ( , )
z
zk t N dt dz
g
g
-
+- ò ,    (6) 
Without loss of any generality, we put Z =¥ , then by (4), (6) becomes, 
{ }1 2( ) 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sdk t g g r n b k t dta am t t s- -= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
           ( ) ( )k t dB ts -- 
0
1( ) ( , )
z
zk t N dt dz
g
g
-
+- ò ,                       (7) 
where, 
2( )
1 ( )
z
zb dz
g
g n+ò ,                                               (8) 
Suppose that the representative agent performs log preferences and the 
intertemporal objective function is specifically given as, 
ˆ
ˆ( )
0
ln ( )s tU e c t dt U
t
r t- +é ù= +ê úê úë ûò  
( )
ˆ
ˆ( ) 1
0
ln (1 ) ( )s t p s pe g r g k t dt U
t
r a a t- + -é ù= - - +ê úê úë ûò .                  (9) 
where denotes expectation operator with respect to probability measure ,r is the 
subjective discount factor, ˆ0 s t" £ < and tˆ is an t - optimal stopping time, which 
with the term ˆU t are simultaneously determined by the following optimal stopping 
problem of the modified Radner fashion, 
( )( , ) ( ) 1ˆ ( , ( )) sup ln ( )s k s pg k e g kr t a a t
t
t t t- + - { <¥}
Î
é ù
ê úë û  1  
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( , ) ( )sup ln( ( ))s k se yr t t
t
t- + { <¥}
Î
é ù= ê úë û 1  
( )ˆ( , ) ( ) 1 ˆˆln ( )s k s pe g kr t a a tt- + - { <¥}é ù= ê úë û 1 .                     (10) 
subject to the stochastic differential equation (SDE) in (7), ( , )s k denotes expectation 
operator based on initial condition ( , ) ( , (0))s k s k , t{ <¥}1 is an indicator function of 
set ( )w t w{ ÎW; <¥} , and { -  stopping times} . 
Now it follows from Step 1 introduced in section 2.2 that we are to consider the 
following stochastic optimal control problem facing the representative agent, 
( )
ˆ
ˆ( ) 1
0 1 0
max ln ( ) ( )
s
s t
p s pr
e g r g k t dt U
t
r a a t- + -
< <
é ù1- - +ê úê úë ûò .                 (9’) 
s.t.  
{ }1 2( ) 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sdk t g g r n b k t dta am t t s- -= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
           ( ) ( )k t dB ts -- 
0
1( ) ( , )
z
zk t N dt dz
g
g
-
+- ò ,                      (7’) 
where tˆ and ˆU t are taken as exogenously given up to present. We prove that there 
exists a continuously differential function ( , ( ))V t k t , satisfying the following 
stochastic Bellman partial differential equation (PDE), 
2 21
2( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( ))t kkV t k t k t V t k ts- -  
( )
0
1 1, ( ) ( ) ( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( )) ( )
z z
kz zV t k t k t V t k t k t V t k t dz
g g
g g n+ +é ù- - - +ê úë ûò  
{ }
1
1 20 1
exp( ( )) ln (1 ) ( ) ( , ( )) ( )
max
1 1 1s
p s p k
r
p k c p s
s t g r g k t V t k t k t
g g r n b
a a
a a
r
m t t s
-
-< <
ì üï ï- + [ - - ]+ï ïï ï= í ï ï´ [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +ï ïï ïî 
.       (11) 
with the boundary condition, 
ˆˆ ˆ( , ( ))V k U tt t = ,                                               (12) 
Thus, we get, 
LEMMA 1. Conditional on the above constructions and assumptions, and up to 
the present step, we obtain the optimal savings rate as follows, 
1ˆ 1 ( )s p p c
r g
g a a
r
m t-
= - -
1+
, 
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Moreover, the value function ( , ( ))V t k t satisfies the following boundary condition, 
ˆ1
1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ( )) exp( ( )) ln ( )V k s C k U
tt t r t r t-= - + [ + ]= . 
where, 
( )
0
1 1 2
( )
1
1 2 1 11 1
2 1 1
ln (1 )
1 ln ( )
c p k
z
z z
g n b
C
dz
r a a
m t
g
g g
r m t s
r
s r r n
- -
1+
-
- -
+ +
ì üï ï+ [ - - + + ]ï ïï ïí ï ï- - + +ï ïï ïî ò
 . 
Proof. See Appendix A. ▌ 
REMARK. Lemma 1 represents a conclusion of Step 1 introduced in section 2.2. 
That is, provided the taxation policies of the government and the finite time horizon 
of the program, the optimal savings rate is derived. And the boundary condition 
shown in Lemma 1 will be useful in computing the exact form of the endogenous 
time as is shown in the sequel. 
Now, by applying Step 2 of the computation algorithm in section 2.2, we are in 
the position to calculate the term ˆU t and the optimal stopping time tˆ , given in (9), in 
a stochastic diffusion process. Firstly, via applying Lemma 1, (7) can be rewritten as, 
{ }1 2ˆ( ) 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sdk t g g r n b k t dta am t t s- -= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
       ( ) ( )k t dB ts -- 
0
1( ) ( , )
z
zk t N dt dz
g
g
-
+- ò ,                      (7’’) 
Let ( ) ( , ( ))Y t s t k t+  , (0) ( , )Y s k  , then the generator of ( )Y t reads as follows, 
{ }1 2ˆ( , ) 1 1 1p k c p ss ks k g g r n b kf fa af m t t s¶ ¶-¶ ¶= + [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
         
2
2
0
2 21
2 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( )
z z
z z kk
k s k k s k k dzf g g fg gs f f n
¶ ¶
+ + ¶¶
+ + [ - - + ]ò ,    (13) 
for 2 2( )Cf" Î  . If we try a functionf of the form, 
( , ) ss k e kr bf -= , for some constantb Î  
We obtain, 
{ }( )1 2ˆ( , ) 1 1 1s p k c p ss k e k g g r n br b a af r b m t t s- -= - + [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +
              
0
21 1
2 1 1( 1) ( ) 1 ( )
zs s
z ze k e k dz
g br b r b b
g gs b b n
- -
+ ++ - + [ - + ]ò  
       ( )se k hr b b-= , 
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in which, 
{ }1 2ˆ( ) 1 1 1p k c p sh g g r n ba ab r b m t t s-- + [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
       
0
21 1
2 1 1( 1) ( ) 1 ( )
z
z z dz
g bb
g gs b b n+ ++ - + [ - + ]ò .                  (14) 
Notice that, 
(0) 0h r=- <   and 
| |
lim ( )h
b
b
¥
=¥ . 
Therefore, there exists 0b> such that ( ) 0h b = and with this value ofb , we put 
1
,                       ( , )
( , )
ln( ),           ( , )
s
s
p
e Ck s k D
s k
e g k s k D
r b
r a af
-
- -
ìï Îï=íï Ïïî
                          (15) 
for some constant 0C> and the continuation region D , to be determined. Thus, if we 
define 
1( , ) ln( )s pg s k e g k
r a a- - . 
We have, by (13), 
{ 1 1 ˆ( , ) ln( ) 1 1 1s p p k c p sg s k e g k g g rr a a a ar m t t- - -= - + [( - )-( + )( - - )]  
}212n b ds- + + +                                (16) 
0>  
{ }1 212ˆ1 1 11 exp p k c p sg g r n b dpk g a am t t sa a r- [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +- - <  
where 
( )
0
1
1 1ln ( )
z
z zd dz
g
g g n+ ++ò ,                                     (17) 
Hence, we can define, 
( ){ }1 212ˆ1 1 11( , ); exp p k c p sg g r n b dpU s k k g a am t t sa a r- [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +- -= < ,         (18) 
Thus, it is natural to guess that the continuation region D has the form, 
ˆ( , );0D s k k k={ < < } .                                          (19) 
for some kˆ such thatU DÍ , i.e., 
( )1 212ˆ1 1 11ˆ exp p k c p sg g r n b dpk g a am t t sa a r- [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +- -³ ,                    (20) 
Thus, (15) can be rewritten as follows, 
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1
ˆ,                       0
( , ) ˆln( ),                 
s
s
p
e Ck k k
s k
e g k k k
r b
r a a
f
-
- -
ìï < <ï=íï ³ïïî
                          (21) 
where ˆ 0k> and C remain to be determined. Moreover, continuity and 
differentiability off at ˆk k= give, 
1ˆ ˆ( ) ln( )pC k g k
b a a-=  
1 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( )C k kbb - -=  
Combining the above equations reveals that, 
ˆ( ) 1
ˆ( )
ˆln( )C k pC k g k
b
b
a a
b
-=  
1 1ˆ exp( )pk g
a a
b
- - =                                          (22) 
And 
11 1 1ˆ( ) exp( )pC k g
b a a b
b b b
- - - -= = [ ] .                                (23) 
To summarize, we have, 
LEMMA 2. Under the above assumptions and constructions, if 0s< , 
1 0zg- < <  a.s. n- ,
0
21
1( ) 1 ( )z dz
b
g n+ò [ - ] <¥ and 
21
2 ( )n z dzs g n- -ò  
1 ˆ1 1 1p k c p sg g r
a am t t-< [( - )-( + )( - - )] 
{ }
0
2 2 23 1 1
2 2 1min , ( ) 1 ( ) ( )zn b n dz z dzgr s r s n g n+£ + - - + - - [ - ] -ò ò  , 
And, 
1 ˆ2 1 1 1 2 ( )p k c p sg g r z dz
a abm t t b g n- [( - )-( + )( - - )]+ ò  
0
2 2 21
12 ( 2 ) ( ) 1 ( )zn dz
b
gb b b s n+- + + + [ - ] <¥ò , 
where b is defined in (8). Then we obtain the optimal t - stopping time, 
ˆˆ inf 0; ( )t k t kt { ³ = } . In other words, 
ˆ1 ˆˆ ( , ) ( )sg s k e k k Ur b b tb
- -= = , 
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which is a supermeanvalued majorant of ( , )g s k with kˆ given by (22) and b is a 
solution of ( ) 0h b = in (14). 
Proof. See Appendix B. ▌ 
REMARK. Obviously, Lemma 2 can be regarded as a conclusion of Step 2 
introduced in section 2.2. And kˆ given in (22) would be seen as the maximal and 
sustainable terminal path level of capital stock per capita that is 
criterion-of-the-modified-Radner-fashion optimal. Noting that kˆ is endogenously 
determined in the current paper while the maximal terminal path level is usually 
exogenously specified in existing literatures15, for instance, the interesting paper of 
Kurz (1965). Consequently, we argue that the advantage of the theory of optimal 
stopping time employed here is that it is available for us to make the minimum time 
to “economic maturity” and the utility-optimal and sustainable terminal path level of 
capital stock per capita simultaneously and endogenously determined. 
 
3.3. Government 
It is assumed that the government continues to tie expenditure levels to 
aggregate output as before, i.e., p pG g Y= with 0 1pg< < , thus, in the absence of 
debt, tax revenues and government expenditures must satisfy the following balanced 
budget constraint, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k k c pr K t c t L t g Y tt t+ = ,                                   (24) 
Using (1’), (2) and Lemma 1, (24) can be rewritten as, 
ˆ(1 )k c p s pg r gt t+ - - = .                                        (25) 
Now, following from Step 3a shown in section 2.2, we consider the following case, 
CASE 1. The goal of the government is to maximize the welfare of the 
representative agent. 
Substituting (25) into (7’’) gives, 
                                                        
15 See, Cass, 1966; and McKenzie, 1976. 
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
0
1 2
1ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
z
p s zdk t k t g r n b dt dB t N dt dz
ga a
gm s s
- -
+
é ù= - + + - -ê úê úë ûò ,    (26) 
And hence the stochastic optimal control problem facing the government can be 
expressed as follows, 
( )
ˆ
ˆ( ) 1
0 1 0
0 1
ˆmax ln ( ) ( )
c
k
s t
p s pe g r g k t dt U
t
r a a t
t
t
- + -
< <
< <
é ù1- - +ê úê úë ûò .                (9’’) 
s.t. 

0
1 2
1ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
z
p s zdk t k t g r n b dt dB t N dt dz
ga a
gm s s
- -
+
é ù= - + + - -ê úê úë ûò . 
Accordingly, the corresponding stochastic Bellman partial differential equation (PDE) 
amounts to, 
2 21
2( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( ))t kkW t k t k t W t k ts- -  
( )
0
1 1, ( ) ( ) ( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( )) ( )
z z
kz zW t k t k t W t k t k t W t k t dz
g g
g g n+ +é ù- - - +ê úë ûò  
1
1 20 1
0 1
ˆexp( ( )) ln (1 ) ( )
max
ˆ( , ( )) ( )( )c
k
p s p
k p s
s t g r g k t
W t k t k t g r n b
a a
a at
t
r
m s
-
-< <
< <
ì üï ï- + [ - - ]ï ï= í ï ï+ - + +ï ïï ïî 
.                   (27) 
with the following boundary condition, 
ˆˆ ˆ( , ( ))W k U tt t = ,                                              (28) 
where ( , ( ))W t k t denotes the value function. To solve the above dynamic optimal 
control problem, the following lemma is derived, 
LEMMA 3. Provided the balanced budget constraint given in (25) and the 
optimal control problem expressed in (9’’), then the optimal capital income tax rate 
is equal to k pgt
* = while optimal consumption tax rate is zero. Moreover, we have, 
ˆ1
3
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( , ( )) exp( ( ))( ln )W k s C k U tt t r t r-= - + + = , 
where tˆ and ˆU t are defined in Lemma 2, kˆ is given in (22) and, 
1 1
1
3 2 2 1 11
2
ln (1 )
1
p pg g nC
b d
r a a
m r mr
s s r r
- -
-
- -
ì üï ï+ [ - -ï ïí ï ï+ + ]- - +ï ïï ïî 
 , 
whereb and d are given in (8) and (17), respectively. 
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Proof. See Appendix C. ▌ 
REMARK. Lemma 3 would be regarded as a conclusion of Step 3a of the 
computation algorithm introduced in section 2.2, and the boundary condition given 
in Lemma 3 will play a crucial role in determining the exact form of the endogenous 
time in the sequel. Moreover, it is worthwhile mentioning that Lemma 3 provides us 
with a case against the well-known argument that capital income should not be taxed 
(Chamley, 1986; Judd, 2002) and even that the optimal income tax rate should be 
negative (Judd, 1997). Not only that, the optimal capital income tax rate is equal to 
an exogenously given constant which is known and controlled by the government, 
and which therefore implies a simple rule of taxation for the government. And it is 
from this character that we claim that our model is in accord with Kydland and 
Prescott (1977). 
Hence, by combining Lemma 3 with Lemma 1, we have, 
1ˆ 1
p
s p g
r g a arm -= - - ,                                            (29) 
And substituting (29) and the results in Lemma 3 into (14) produce, 
1 2( ) (1 )p ph g g n b
a ab r b m r s-- + [ - - - + + ]  
          
0
21 1
2 1 1( 1) ( ) 1 ( )
z
z z dz
g bb
g gs b b n+ ++ - + [ - + ]ò ,                  (14’) 
Now, by Lemma 2, we have, 
ˆ 1 ˆ( )sU e k kt r b bb
- -= ,                                            (30) 
where (0) 0k k= > , kˆ is given in (22), andb is a solution of equation ( ) 0h b = in 
(14’). Combining (30) with Lemma 3 shows that, 
1
3
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( , ( )) exp( ( ))( ln )W k s C kt t r t r-= - + +  
1 ˆexp( ) ( )s k kb bbr
-= -  
 ˆU t= . 
which implies that, 
ˆ1 1
3
ˆˆ ln ( ) ( ln )kk C k
bt r b r- -= [ + ] ,                                   (31) 
To summarize, we have the following theorem, 
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THEOREM 1. Based on Lemma 1 to Lemma 3, and suppose the goal of the 
government is to maximize the welfare of the representative agent, we have, 
ˆ1 1
3
ˆˆ ln ( ) ( ln )kk C k
bt r b r- -= [ + ] , 
where (0) 0k k= > , kˆ is given in (22), b is a solution of ( ) 0h b = in (14’), and 3C is 
given in Lemma 3. 
REMARK. It is by Theorem 1 that we confirm that the minimum time needed to 
“economic maturity” is endogenously determined and explicitly represented. And, in 
particular, the endogenous time depends on the following relevant parameters: the 
subject discount factor, the initial level of capital stock per capita, the utility-optimal 
and sustainable terminal path level of capital stock per capita, the natural growth rate 
of population, the exogenous level of government spending and also the volatility of 
the macro-economy. And one may, if motivated, develop more thorough comparative 
static analyses of the endogenous time with respect to the above relevant parameters. 
Noting that Theorem 1 is a conclusion of Step 4 of the computation algorithm in 
section 2.2, we now consider the following case corresponding to Step 3b of the 
computation algorithm. 
CASE 2. The goal of the government is to minimize the optimal stopping time of 
the representative agent. 
Now by Lemma 2, we have, 
ˆ 1 ˆ( )sU e k kt r b bb
- -= ,                                            (32) 
where (0) 0k k= > , kˆ is given in (22), andb is a solution of equation ( ) 0h b = in (14). 
Combining (32) with Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 shows that, 
1
1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ( )) exp( ( )) ln ( )V k s C kt t r t r t
-= - + [ + ] 
1
1
ˆˆexp( ( ))( ln )s C kr t r-= - + +  
1 ˆexp( ) ( )s k kb bbr
-= -  
 ˆU t= . 
which implies that, 
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ˆ1 1
1
ˆˆ ln ( ) ( ln )kk C k
bt r b r- -= [ + ] .                                   (33) 
where 1C is given in Lemma 1. Thus, the problem facing the government can be 
expressed as, 
PROBLEM 1. The government is motivated to choose taxation policies so as to 
minimize the stopping time defined in (33). 
REMARK. Problem 1 is actually a nonlinear optimization problem and here we 
don’t try to solve it due to its complication. Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that 
the stopping time given in (33) may be fundamentally different from that given in 
Theorem 1. It is easy to notice that different goals of the government usually lead to 
different fiscal policies, thereby resulting different short-run and direct economic 
consequences and even different speeds and paths of economic development. And it 
is especially worth noting that there is a conjecture or possibility that the minimum 
time needed to “economic maturity” when the goal of the government is to minimize 
the endogenous time may be much longer than that when the goal of the government 
is to maximize the welfare of the representative agent. And here we provide one 
reasonable explanation that the incentive or motivation of investment of the 
representative agent may be terribly distorted when the goal of the government is not 
to maximize the welfare of the representative agent but to directly minimize the time 
needed to “economic maturity”, thereby implying the micro-foundation of economic 
development is also distorted and hence retarding the speed of economic 
development. That is, there may exist a trade-off for the government, i.e., the speed 
of long-term economic development on the one hand and the short-term welfare of 
the representative agent on the other hand. Therefore, the lesson for us is that for the 
government of an underdeveloped economy, choosing an appropriate development 
strategy and hence appropriate fiscal policies are of crucial importance in affecting 
and even determining the long-term speed and path of the convergence of the 
corresponding economical system, and thus the long-term equilibrium level of the 
economy and welfare level of the representative agent. 
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4. PREFERENCE MANIFOLD TWO 
In this section, our goal is to introduce a new type of preference manifold of the 
representative agent different from that in section 3. The firm will employ the same 
kind of production technology as is shown in section 3.1, so we begin our analyses 
from the representative agent. 
 
4.1. Representative Agent 
Our analyses will proceed according to the computation algorithm introduced in 
section 2.2, that is, the representative agent will choose an optimal savings rate and 
then the optimal stopping time. Different from (9), we introduce the following 
objective function of the modified Ramsey fashion, 
( )( ) ( )
0
ln (1 ) ( ) ln ( )s t sp sU e g r y t dt e y
t r r t t
*
*- + - + *é ùê ú= - - +
ê úë ûò
 .           (34) 
where 0 s t*£ < andt* is an t - optimal stopping time, which is determined by the 
following optimal stopping problem, 
( , ( ))g kt t*  
( ) ( )( , ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1
0
sup ln (1 ) ( ) ln ( )s k s t sp s p pe g r g k t dt e g k
t
r a a r t a a
t
t
t- + - - + - { <¥}
Î
é ù- - +ê úê úë ûò  1  
( ) ( )( , ) ( ) ( )
0
sup ln (1 ) ( ) ln ( )s k s t sp se g r y t dt e y
t
r r t
t
t
t- + - + { <¥}
Î
é ù= - - +ê úê úë ûò 1  
( ) ( )( , ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1
0
ln (1 ) ( ) ln ( )s k s t sp s p pe g r g k t dt e g k
t r a a r t a a
t
t
*
*
*
- + - - + - *
{ <¥}
é ù
ê ú= - - +
ê úë ûò
 1  
(35) 
subject to the SDE defined in (7), and one may easily tell the difference between (35) 
and (10). Next, similar to (9’), we consider the optimal control problem as follows, 
( )( ) ( )
0 1 0
max ln (1 ) ( ) ln ( )
s
s t s
p sr
e g r y t dt e y
t r r t t
*
*- + - + *
< <
é ù
ê ú- - +
ê úë ûò
 ,           (36) 
s.t. 
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{ }1 2( ) 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sdk t g g r n b k t dta am t t s- -= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
           ( ) ( )k t dB ts -- 
0
1( ) ( , )
z
zk t N dt dz
g
g
-
+- ò .                      (37) 
where t* is taken as exogenously given up to present step. To solve the above 
dynamic optimization problem and employ ( , ( ))V t k t as the corresponding value 
function, then we get, 
LEMMA 4. Provided the above constructions and assumptions, the following 
optimal savings rate is derived, 
11 ( )s p p c
r g
g a a
r
m t
*
-= - - 1+
, 
And the value function ( , ( ))V t k t satisfies the following boundary condition, 
( ) 1 ( ) 1
1( , ( )) ln ( ) ln ( )
s s
pV k e C k e g k
r t r t a at t r t t
* ** * - + - * - + - *= [ + ]= [ ] . 
where 1C is defined in Lemma 1. 
REMARK. Lemma 4 is a natural correspondence to Lemma 1. 
Noting that the proof of Lemma 4 is the same as that of Lemma 1, so we take it 
omitted. In what follows, we will determine the optimal stopping timet* . After 
applying Lemma 4, the optimal path of capital accumulation can be expressed as 
follows, 
{ }1 2( ) 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sdk t g g r n b k t dta am t t s- * -= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
       ( ) ( )k t dB ts -- 
0
1( ) ( , )
z
zk t N dt dz
g
g
-
+- ò ,                     (37’) 
Let ( ) ( , ( ))Y t s t k t+  , (0) ( , )Y s k  , then the generator of ( )Y t reads as follows, 
{ }1 2( , ) 1 1 1p k c p ss ks k g g r n b kf fa af m t t s¶ ¶- *¶ ¶= + [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
         
2
2
0
2 21
2 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( )
z z
z z kk
k s k k s k k dzf g g fg gs f f n
¶ ¶
+ + ¶¶
+ + [ - - + ]ò ,    (38) 
for 2 2( )Cf" Î  . If we try a functionf of the form, 
( , ) ( )ss k e krf j-= , for 2 ( )CjÎ   
Then we have, 
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{ }( )1 2( , ) ( ) 1 1 1 ( )s p k c p ss k e k g g r n b k kr a af rj m t t s j- - * ¢= - + [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +
         { }
0
2 21 1
2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
zs
z ze k k k k k k dz
gr
g gs j j j j n
-
+ +¢¢ ¢+ + [ - + ]ò  
       0 ( )
se kr j-  .                                              (39) 
Define 1( ) ln( )pg k g k
a a- , 1( ) ln (1 )p s pf k g r g ka a* -[ - - ] , by (35) and (39), we see 
that, 
0 ( ) ( ) 0g k f k+ >  
1 1ln( ) ln (1 )p p s pg k g r g k
a a a ar - * - - [ - - ]<  
1 21
21 1 1p k c p sg g r n b
a am t t s- *[( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
0
1
1 1ln( ) ( )
z
z z dz
g
g g n+ ++ [ + ]ò  
{ }1 2121 1 11 1 ( 1) 1(1 ) exp p k c p sg g r n b dp p sk g g r a am t t sa a r r- *[( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +- - * - - < - - . 
whereb and d are defined in (8) and (17), respectively. Hence, 
( ){ }1 2121 1 11 1 ( 1) 1( , ); (1 ) exp p k c p sg g r n b dp p sU s k k g g r a am t t sa a r r- *[( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +- - * - -= < - - (40) 
In view ofU DÍ it is natural to guess that the continuation region D has the form, 
( , );0D s k k k*={ < < } .                                         (41) 
for some k* satisfying, 
( )1 2121 1 11 1 ( 1) 1(1 ) exp p k c p sg g r n b dp p sk g g r a am t t sa a r r- *[( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +* - - * - -³ - - ,     (42) 
Now, in D we try to solve the equation, 
0 ( ) ( ) 0k f kj + = .                                            (43) 
The homogenous equation 0 0 ( )kj has a solution 0 ( ) rk kj = if and only if, 
{ }1 2( ) 1 1 1p k c p sh r r g g r n ba ar m t t s- *- + [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
          
0
21 1
2 1 1( 1) ( ) 1 ( ) 0
zrr
z zr r dz
g
g gs n+ ++ - + [ - + ] =ò ,                (44) 
Since (0) 0h r=- < and | |lim ( )r h r¥ =¥ , we see that the equation ( ) 0h r = has two 
solutions 1r , 2r such that 2 10r r< < . We let r be a solution of this equation. To find a 
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particular solution 1( )kj of the non-homogenous equation, 
1
0 1( ) ln (1 ) 0p s pk g r g k
a aj * -+ [ - - ]= ,                             (45) 
We try, 
1 5 6( ) lnk C C kj = + ,                                            (46) 
for some constants 5C , 6C to be determined. Substituting (46) into (45) and applying 
(39), we have, 
{ }1 25 6 6ln 1 1 1p k c p sC C k g g r n b Ca ar r m t t s- *- - + [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
0
2 11 1
6 62 1 1ln( ) ( ) ln (1 ) 0
z
p s pz zC C dz g r g k
g a a
g gs n
* -
+ +- + [ + ] + [ - - ]=ò . 
which implies that, 
1
6C r
-= ,                                                     (47) 
Hence, 
{ }
( )
0
1 1 2
1
5 2 1 1 11 1
2 1 1
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
ln ( ) ln (1 )
p k c p s
z
p s pz z
g g r n b
C
dz g r g
a a
g a a
g g
r m t t s
r
s r r n
- - *
-
- - * -
+ +
ì üï ï[ - - + - - ]- + + -ï ïï ï= í ï ï+ + + [ - - ]ï ïï ïî ò
.     (48) 
Consequently, for all constantsC the function, 
1
5( ) ln
rk Ck k Cj r-= + + ,                                      (49) 
is a solution of the equation defined in (43) with 5C given by (48). Thus, one can try 
to put, 
1
5
1
ln ,                       0
( )
( ) ln( ),                             
r
p
Ck k C k k
k
g k g k k ka a
r
j
- *
- *
ìï + + < <ï=íï ³ïî 
                  (50) 
where 0k* > and C remain to be determined. Continuity and differentiability 
ofj at k k*= give the following equations, 
1 1
5( ) ln ln( )
r
pC k k C g k
a ar* - * - *+ + = ,                             (51) 
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )rCr k k kr* - - * - * -+ = .                                   (52) 
By (52) we get, 
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11( )r rCk
r--* = ,                                                  (53) 
Inserting (53) into (51) produces, 
(1 )(1 ) 51
1exp( )
C
p rk g
ar
a r r
r
- -*
-= + ,                                       (54) 
And by (52) we get, 
1
( )rr k
C r
r *
-= .                                                    (55) 
which implies that we should choose, 
2 0r r= < ,                                                    (56) 
in (44). To sum up, we have the following lemma, 
LEMMA 5. Under the above assumptions and constructions, if 0s< , 
1 0zg- < <  a.s. n- , (1 ) ( )r rr k k*- > and 
ln(1 )p sg rr
*- - -  
1 21
2(1 ) (1 )(1 )p k c p sg g r n b d
a am t t s- *³ [ - - + - - ]- + + + , 
whereb and d are defined in (8) and (17), respectively. And, 
21
2 ( )n z dzs g n- -ò  
1 1 1 1p k c p sg g r
a am t t- *< [( - )-( + )( - - )] 
0
2 23 1 1
2 2 1( ) 1 ( ) ( )zn dz z dzgr s n g n+£ + - - [ - ] -ò ò   
Then we obtain the optimal t - stopping time, inf 0; ( )t k t kt* *{ ³ = } . That is to 
say, 1 1 5( )( , ) lnr
s r
r k
g s k e k k Crr
r
r*-* - -= [ + + ] is a supermeanvalued majorant 
of ( , )g s k with k* given by (54), (0) 0k k= > , 0r< determined by (44) and 5C given in 
(48). 
Proof. See Appendix D. ▌ 
REMARK. Lemma 5 is a natural correspondence to Lemma 2. And one can 
clearly and easily tell the differences between the two lemmas. 
 
4.2. Government 
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Similar to section 3.3, and applying Lemma 4, the balanced budget constraint 
(24) can be expressed as follows, 
(1 )k c p s pg r gt t
*+ - - = .                                       (25’) 
CASE 1. The goal of the government is to maximize the welfare of the 
representative agent. 
Hence, the stochastic optimal control problem facing the government can be 
written as follows, 
( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) 1
0 1 0
0 1
max ln (1 ) ( ) ln ( )
c
k
s t s
p s p pe g r g k t dt e g k
t
r a a r t a a
t
t
t
*
*- + - - + - *
< <
< <
é ù
ê ú- - +
ê úë ûò
 (57) 
s.t. 

0
1 2
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
z
p s zdk t k t g r n b dt dB t N dt dz
ga a
gm s s
- - *
+
é ù= - + + - -ê úê úë ûò .    (58) 
Solving the problem gives, 
LEMMA 6. Provided the balanced budget constraint given in (25’) and the 
optimal control problem expressed in (57) and (58), then the optimal capital income 
tax rate is k pgt
* = and optimal consumption tax rate is zero. Moreover, the 
corresponding value function satisfies the following boundary condition, 
( ) 1 ( ) 1
3( , ( )) ( ln ) ln( )
s s
pW k e C k e g k
r t r t a at t r
* ** * - + - * - + - *= + = , 
wheret* is defined in Lemma 5, k* is given in (54) and 3C is given in Lemma 3. 
REMARK. Lemma 6 is a natural correspondence to Lemma 3. 
Noting that the proof is the same as that of Lemma 3, we take it omitted here. 
Applying Lemma 6 to Lemma 4, we get, 
11
p
s p g
r g a arm -
* = - - .                                            (59) 
Inserting (59) into (58) produces the following optimal law of motion of capital 
accumulation, 
{ }
0
1 2
1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( , )
z
p p zdk t k t g g n b dt dB t N dt dz
ga a
gm r s s
- -
+= [ - - - + + ] - -ò (60) 
Moreover, applying Lemma 6 and (59) to (44) and (48) shows, 
 25
1 2( ) (1 )p ph r r g g n b
a ar m r s-=- + [ - - - + + ]  
          
0
21 1
2 1 1( 1) ( ) 1 ( ) 0
zrr
z zr r dz
g
g gs n+ ++ - + [ - + ] =ò ,                (44’) 
And, 
1 1
1
5 2 2 1 11
2
(1 )
ln
p pg g nC
b d
a a
r
m
r m r
r
s s r r
- -
-
- -
ì üï ï[ - - - +ï ï= í ï ï+ ]- + +ï ïï ïî 
.                          (48’) 
whereb and d are defined in (8) and (17), respectively. So k* in (54) can be expressed 
as, 
(1 )(1 ) 51
1exp( )
C
p rk g
ar
a r r
r
- -*
-= + ,                                      (54’) 
where 0r< is a solution of (44’) and 5C is defined in (48’). Therefore, we conclude 
the following theorem, 
THEOREM 2. Based on Lemma 4 to Lemma 6, and provided the goal of the 
government is to choose tax policies so as to maximize the welfare of the 
representative agent, then the optimal stopping time given in Lemma 5 can be 
completely characterized as follows, 
inf 0; ( )t k t kt* *{ ³ = } ,                                        (61) 
where ( )k t is determined by (60) and k* is given in (54’). 
REMARK. Theorem 2 is a natural correspondence to Theorem 1. 
Furthermore, it follows from Theorem 2 that, 
COROLLARY 1. Suppose
0
2( 1) ( )z dznò  <¥ , where 2 21 min ,1z z { } , 
and
0 1
( ) ( )z pz dz
g
g n+ò <¥ for p" Î and 2p³ . Then the solution of (60) is 
in 2 ( , )L W  and 
( )( ),
0
sup ( ) 1
p p
M T p
t T
k t k k k* *
< £
é ù
- £ + -ê ú
ê úë û
 Y , 
where (0) 0k k= > , k* is given in (54’) and 
{ 02 21 2 2( ), 1exp ( ) 1 (1 ) ( ) ( )zM T p p p zM T g g n b dzga a gm r s s n- +é + - - - + + + +ò +êë Y
 26
( ) }0 021 2 21 1(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )pp p z z pp p z zg g n b dz dzg ga a g gm r s s n n- + + ù- - - + + + + ò +ò úû  , 
for some constant 0M > and M depends onT with 0 T< £¥ . 
Proof. See Appendix E. ▌ 
CASE 2. The goal of the government is to minimize the optimal stopping time of 
the representative agent. 
As a matter of fact, we get the following interesting theorem, 
THEOREM 3. Suppose that
0
2( 1) ( )z dznò  <¥ and 0 1( ) ( )z pz dzgg n+ò <¥  
for p" Î and 2p³ , then the solution of (58) is in 2 ( , )L W  and 
( )( ),
0
sup ( ) 1
p p
M T p
t T
k t k k k* *
< £
é ù
- £ + -ê ú
ê úë û
 Y , 
where (0) 0k k= > , k* is given in (54’),( ),M T pY is minimized by letting k pgt = and 
0ct = , and( ), ( ),M T p M T pY Y point-wise as 0ct  or k pgt  . 
Proof. See Appendix F. ▌ 
REMARK. In view of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 shows that there is a technical 
difference between the modified Radner fashion and the modified Ramsey fashion, 
that is, the endogenous time can be explicitly computed and represented in the 
preference manifold of the modified Radner fashion shown in Theorem 1 while this 
cannot be realized in that of the modified Ramsey fashion. Therefore, noting that the 
endogenous time can not be explicitly represented as in Theorem 2, Corollary 1 and 
Theorem 3 are of crucial economic intuitions and implications. Specifically, 
Theorem 3 reveals that in the case of p ( p" Î and 2p³ ) order moment of uniform 
topology, the goal of the government expressed in the above Case 2 can be 
equivalently expressed as choosing optimal tax rates corresponding to the best 
constant ( ), ( ),0,| c k pM T p M T pgt t* *= = =Y Y . Obviously, one may choose different distance 
functions equipped with different topologies, thereby resulting different equivalent 
expressions of the above Case 2 and thus even different corresponding optimal tax 
rates. Finally, it is worthwhile emphasizing that the utility-optimal and sustainable 
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terminal path level of capital stock per capita is usually not the same between the 
above two different preference manifolds, and thus the corresponding endogenous 
times may be not equivalent. That is to say, one type of preference manifold may 
imply a faster speed to its corresponding “economic maturity” than that of other 
types of preference manifolds16. 
 
5. THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION STRUCTURE 
In this section, we will investigate the influences of different information 
structures on the endogenous time, and we will take preference manifold one in 
section 3 for example. 
 
5.1. Definitions and Notations 
First of all, besides the filtration 0t t T£ £{ }  introduced in section 3.2, we 
suppose that we are given another two filtrations 0t t T£ £{ }H  and 0t t T£ £{ }M   
with, 
t t tÍ Í   , 0 t T£ £ . 
which represent three kinds of information levels available to the agent at time t . 
And we give the following definitions17, 
DEFINITION 1. ( Incomplete Information): 
If the control of the agent is H- predictable, we say that the agent has 
incomplete information. 
DEFINITION 2. (Complete Information): 
If the control of the agent is - predictable, we say that the agent has complete 
information. 
DEFINITION 3. (Perfect Information): 
                                                        
16 The current paper shows that different preference structures lead to different levels of “economic maturity” with 
a high probability and thus different speeds and paths of economic development. However, it is also possible that 
the convergence rate is equal between different economical systems with different preference manifolds although 
they have totally different sustainable terminal path levels of capital stock per capita. 
17 Similar definitions can be found in Miao (2009), who studies optimal consumption and portfolio choice in a 
Merton-style model with incomplete information when there is a distinction between ambiguity and risk. 
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If the control of the agent isM-predictable, we say that the agent has perfect 
information. 
Moreover, based upon the above three definitions, we can define, 
DEFINITION 4. (Symmetric Information): 
For any two agents, if they share the same level of information, no matter it is 
incomplete, complete or perfect information, we say that the information is 
symmetric between the two agents. 
DEFINITION 5. (Asymmetric Information): 
For any two agents, if they don’t share the same level of information, we say 
that the information is asymmetric between them. 
 
5.2. Representative Agent 
It is worth emphasizing that we focus on different information structures 
between the representative agent and the government, so the firm in this section is 
the same as that in section 3.1. And hence, we begin our analyses from the 
representative agent. Firstly, a little different from the SDE defined in (3), we 
introduce, 

0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )d L t L t ndt d B t zN d t dzs g- - -é ù= + +ê úê úë ûò ,                    (3’) 
where we have put Z =¥ in (4) and ( )d B t- , ( , )N d t dz- denote forward integrals. 
Then, combining (3’) with (5) and applying Itô-Ventzell formula for forward 
processes, 
{ }1 2 0( ) 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sd k t g g r n b k t dta am t t s- -= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
            ( ) ( )k t d B ts -- 
0
1( ) ( , )
z
zk t N d t dz
g
g
-
+- ò ,                     (62) 
where, 
2
0
( )
0 1 ( )
z
zb dz
g
g n+ò ,                                             (8’) 
Hence, by (1’), (62) and Itô-Ventzell formula, we have, 
{ }1 1 2 0( ) 1 1 1 ( )p p k c p sd y t g g g r n b k t dta a a am t t s- - -= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
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            1 ( ) ( )pg k t d B t
a as- -- 
0
1
1( ) ( , )
z
p zg k t N d t dz
ga a
g
- -
+- ò  
          
0
( , , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , )t dt t d B t t z N d t dzV x w w q w- -+ +ò  ,          (63) 
wherew ÎWand, 
1 p sg rx - - ,                                                 (64) 
And hence, a little different from (9’) and (7’), we consider the following stochastic 
optimal control problem facing the representative agent, 
( )
ˆ
ˆ( )
0 1 0
max ln ( )
s
s t
r
e y t dt U
t
r tx- +
< <
é ù+ê úê úë ûò ,                               (65) 
s.t. 

0
( ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , )d y t t dt t d B t t z N d t dzV x w w q w- - -= + +ò , 
Thus, the corresponding Hamiltonian18 can be expressed as follows, 
( , , , ) exp( ( )) ln ( ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , )tH t y s t y t t t D tx w r x G V x w w+é= - + [ ]+ +ë   
0
, ( , , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )t z tD t z dz t D tq w n w G+
ù+ +úúûò   
0
, ,( ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( )t z t zD t t z D t z dzG q w q w n++ [ + ]ò ,           (66) 
wherew ÎW , tD , tD + , ,t zD and ,t zD + denote Malliavin derivatives and,  
ˆ
( )( ) ln ( )s ytt e y d
t
r lG x l l- + ¶¶ [ ]ò  
ˆ
( ) 1
( )
s
yt
e d
t
r l
l l
- += ò ,                                       (67) 
Then we have the following proposition, 
PROPOSITION 1. Based on Definition 1 to Definition 3, and provided the above 
specifications, we have: 
(i) If the representative agent has incomplete information, then the optimal 
savings rate is, 

2 1
1
exp( ( )) (1 ) ( ) ( )|
( ) 1
p c t
s p s t g k t t
r t g a ar m t G-+ [ + ]= - -   ,                         (68) 
where ( ( ))( ) ( )sr tk t k t and ( ( ))( ) ( )sr tt tG G with( )sr t -H predictable. 
                                                        
18 See Meyer-Brandis et al (2009). 
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(ii) If the representative agent has complete information, then the optimal 
savings rate is, 

2 1
1
exp( ( )) (1 ) ( ) ( )|
( ) 1
p c t
s p s t g k t t
r t g a ar m t G-+ [ + ]= - -   ,                         (69) 
where ( ( ))( ) ( )sr tk t k t and ( ( ))( ) ( )sr tt tG G with( )sr t - predictable. 
(iii) If the representative agent has perfect information, then the optimal savings 
rate is, 

2 1
1
exp( ( )) (1 ) ( ) ( )|
( ) 1
p c t
s p s t g k t t
r t g a ar m t G-+ [ + ]= - -   ,                         (70) 
where ( ( ))( ) ( )sr tk t k t and ( ( ))( ) ( )sr tt tG G with( )sr t M-predictable. 
Proof. See Appendix G. ▌ 
REMARK. Proposition 1 is a natural correspondence to Lemma 1. And we may 
easily tell the differences between Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, which reflects the 
fact that consideration of different information structures is not only necessary but 
also important. 
Now, we are in the position to calculate the term ˆU t and the optimal stopping 
time tˆ given in (65). That is, we are to solve the optimal stopping problem defined in 
(10) subject to the following SDE, 
 { }1 2 0( ) 1 1 1 ( ) ( )p k c p sd k t g g r t n b k t dta am t t s- -= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
        ( ) ( )k t d B ts --  
0
1( ) ( , )
z
zk t N d t dz
g
g
-
+- ò ,                     (71) 
where( )sr t and( )k t are given in Proposition 1, and 0b is defined in (8’). It is easy to 
see that the construction of this problem is quite similar to that one in section 3.2, 
and rather, we have the following proposition, 
PROPOSITION 2. Conditional on the same assumptions and constructions as 
that of Lemma 2, if 
1 2
01 1 1 (0)p k c p sg g r n b
a am t t r s- [( - )-( + )( - - )]< + - - , 
21
02n b ds- - -  
1 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sg g r ta am t t-< [( - )-( + )( - - )] 
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21
02n b dr s£ + - - - , a.e. 
And, 
1 21
021 1 1 ( )p k c p sg g r t n b d
a am t t s- [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + + <¥ , a.e. 
where 0b and d are defined in (8’) and (17), respectively, and ( )sr t is given in 
Proposition 1. Then we obtain the optimal t - stopping time ˆˆ inf 0; ( )t k t kt { ³ = } . 
In other words, 
ˆ1 ˆˆ ( , ) ( )sg s k e k k Ur b b tb
- -= = , 
which is a supermeanvalued majorant of ( , )g s k with kˆ given by (22), andb is a 
solution of, 
 { }1 2 0( ) 1 1 1 (0)p k c p sh g g r n ba ab r b m t t s-- + [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
       
0
21 1
2 1 1( 1) ( ) 1 ( ) 0
z
z z dz
g bb
g gs b b n+ ++ - + [ - + ] =ò , 
with(0)sr determined by Proposition 1. 
Proof. See Appendix H. ▌ 
REMARK. Proposition 2 is a natural correspondence to Lemma 2. And a 
comparison of Proposition 2 and Lemma 2 shows that different information 
structures will intrinsically lead to different sustainable terminal path levels of capital 
stock per capita thanks to Proposition 1, where optimal savings rate strictly depends 
on the given level of information. Therefore, noting that the utility-optimal and 
sustainable terminal path level of capital stock per capita changed, thereby implying 
a different minimum time needed to “economic maturity” relative to Lemma 2. 
 
5.3. Government 
Firstly, similar to section 3.3, the balanced budget constraint defined in (24) can 
be expressed as follows, 
(1 ( ))k c p s pg r t gt t+ - - = ,                                     (25’’) 
And we specifically consider the following case, 
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ASSUMPTION 1. The goal of the government is to choose tax policies so as to 
maximize the welfare of the representative agent. 
Inserting (25’’) into (71) gives, 
   
0
1 2
0 1( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( , )
z
p s zd k t k t g r t n b dt d B t N d t dz
ga a
gm s s
- - - -
+
é ù= - + + - -ê úê úë ûò ,  (72) 
Thus applying Itô-Ventzell formula leads to, 
   
0
1 1 2
0 1( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( , )
z
p p s zd y t g k t g r t n b dt d B t N d t dz
ga a a a
gm s s
- - - - -
+
é ù= - + + - -ê úê úë ûò
          
0
ˆˆˆ( , , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , )ct dt t d B t t z N d t dzV t w w q w
- -+ +ò  ,          (73) 
Hence, the stochastic optimal control problem facing the government can be written 
as follows, 
 ( )ˆ ˆ( )
0 1 0
0 1
max ln (1 ( )) ( )
c
k
s t
p se g r t y t dt U
t
r t
t
t
- +
< <
< <
é ù- - +ê úê úë ûò ,                    (74) 
s.t. 
 
0
ˆˆˆ( ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , )cd y t t dt t d B t t z N d t dzV t w w q w
- - -= + +ò , 
where ˆU t and tˆ are given in Proposition 2, and ( )sr t is given in Proposition 1. 
Accordingly, the corresponding Hamiltonian19 amounts to, 
   ˆ ˆˆ( , , , ) exp( ( )) ln (1 ( )) ( ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , )c p s c tH t y s t g r t y t t t D tt w r G V t w w+é ù é= - + - - + +ê ú ëë û 
                 
0
,
ˆ ˆ( , , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )t z tD t z dz t D tq w n w G+
ù+ +úúûò   

0
, ,
ˆ ˆ( ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( )t z t zD t t z D t z dzG q w q w n++ [ + ]ò ,           (75) 
wherew ÎW , tD , tD + , ,t zD and ,t zD + denote Malliavin derivatives and,  
  ˆ ( )
ˆ( ) ln (1 ( )) ( )
s
p syt
t e g r y d
t
r lG l l l- + ¶¶ é ù- -ê úë ûò  

ˆ
( ) 1
( )
s
yt
e d
t
r l
l
l- += ò ,                                       (76) 
where( )y t is determined by SDE in (73). Therefore, the following proposition is 
derived, 
                                                        
19 See Meyer-Brandis et al (2009). 
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PROPOSITION 3. Based upon Assumption 1 and the above specifications, we 
establish, 
(i) If the information is symmetric between the representative agent and the 
government, then the optimal consumption tax rate is zero and the optimal capital 
income tax rate is equal to pg . 
(ii) If the information is asymmetric between the representative agent and the 
government, and particularly, the representative agent gets more information than 
the government, then we obtain that the optimal consumption tax rate is zero and the 
optimal capital income tax rate is equal to pg . 
(iii) If the information is asymmetric between the representative agent and the 
government, and particularly, the government has more information than the 
representative agent, then, 
(iii-a) If the government has perfect information while the representative agent 
has complete information, then we have, 
   (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c t tk t t k t tt G G
* ** **é ù é ù+ =ê ú ê úë û ë û
   ,                        (77) 
where ct
* denotes the optimal consumption tax rate and 
  ( )( ) ( ) ck t k t t
**  ,  ( )( ) ( ) ct t tG G
**  , 
with ct
* M-predictable. 
(iii-b) If the government has perfect information while the representative agent 
has incomplete information, then we get, 
   (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c t tk t t k t tt G G
* ** **é ù é ù+ =ê ú ê úë û ë û
   ,                        (78) 
where  ( )( ) ( ) ck t k t t
**  and  ( )( ) ( ) ct t tG G
**  with ct* M-predictable. 
(iii-c) If the government has complete information while the representative 
agent has incomplete information, then we get, 
   (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c t tk t t k t tt G G
* ** **é ù é ù+ =ê ú ê úë û ë û
   ,                         (79) 
where  ( )( ) ( ) ck t k t t
**  and  ( )( ) ( ) ct t tG G
**  with ct* - predictable. 
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Proof. See Appendix I. ▌ 
REMARK. Proposition 3 is a natural correspondence to Lemma 3. And it is 
worth emphasizing that Proposition 3 itself is very interesting and important 
especially for the case where the government gets more information than the 
representative agent. Specifically, for the current endogenous growth economy, if the 
information is symmetric between the government and the representative agent or 
the representative agent gets more information than the government, then the optimal 
capital income tax rate is always equal to the exogenously given constant pg . 
However, optimal tax rate on capital income may be zero when the government gets 
more information than the representative agent. 
Thus, combining Proposition 3 with Proposition 1 gives the following corollary, 
COROLLARY 2. (i) For this case of symmetric information or the representative 
agent has more information, we have: 
(i-a) If the representative agent has incomplete information, then the optimal 
savings rate is, 

 2 1
1
exp( ( )) ( ) ( ) |
( ) 1
p t
s p s t g k t t
r t g
a ar m G
* *-
*
+ [ ]
= - -
 
,                           (80) 
(i-b) If the representative agent has complete information, then the optimal 
savings rate is, 

 2 1
1
exp( ( )) ( ) ( ) |
( ) 1
p t
s p s t g k t t
r t g
a ar m G
* *-
*
+ [ ]
= - -
 
,                           (81) 
(i-c) If the representative agent has perfect information, then the optimal 
savings rate is, 

 2 1
1
exp( ( )) ( ) ( ) |
( ) 1
p t
s p s t g k t t
r t g
a ar m G
* *-
*
+ [ ]
= - -
 
,                          (82) 
(ii) For the case of asymmetric information and particularly the government 
has more information: 
(ii-a) If the government has perfect information while the representative agent 
has complete information, then the optimal savings rate is, 

 2 1
1
exp( ( )) ( ) ( ) |
( ) 1
p t
s p s t g k t t
r t g
a ar m G
* *-
*
+ [ ]
= - -
 
,                          (83) 
(ii-b) If the government has perfect information while the representative agent 
 35
has incomplete information, then the optimal savings rate is, 

 2 1
1
exp( ( )) ( ) ( ) |
( ) 1
p t
s p s t g k t t
r t g
a ar m G
* *-
*
+ [ ]
= - -
 
,                          (84) 
(ii-c) If the government has complete information while the representative agent 
has incomplete information, then the optimal savings rate is, 

 2 1
1
exp( ( )) ( ) ( ) |
( ) 1
p t
s p s t g k t t
r t g
a ar m G
* *-
*
+ [ ]
= - -
 
,                           (85) 
Now, by Proposition 2, we have, 
ˆ 1 ˆ( )sU e k kt r b bb
- -= , 
Thus, 
ˆ ˆ( ) 11 ˆ ˆ( ) ln( )s s pU e k k e g k
t r b b r t a a
b
- - - + -= =  
ˆ1 1 ˆˆ ln ( ) ln( )k pk g k
b a at r b- - = [ ],                                  (86) 
Therefore, we conclude the following theorem, 
THEOREM 4. Based on the above propositions and Corollary 2, we have, 
(i) The corresponding optimal stopping time is given by (86), 
where (0) 0k k= > , kˆ is given in (22) andb is a solution of, 
 ( )1 2 0( ) (0)p sh g r n ba ab r b m s* *-- + - + +  
      
0
21 1
2 1 1( 1) ( ) 1 ( ) 0
z
z z dz
g bb
g gs b b n+ ++ - + [ - + ] =ò ,                (87) 
where(0)sr
*
is determined by (80). 
(ii) The optimal stopping time is given by (86), where (0) 0k k= > , kˆ is given in 
(22) , andb is a solution of (87) with(0)sr
*
determined by (81). 
(iii) The optimal stopping time is given by (86), where (0) 0k k= > , kˆ is given in 
(22) , andb is a solution of (87) with(0)sr
*
determined by (82). 
(iv) The optimal stopping time is given by (86), where (0) 0k k= > , kˆ is given in 
(22) , andb is a solution of, 
 { }1 2 0( ) 1 1 1 (0)p k c p sh g g r n ba ab r b m t t s* *- * *é ù- + ( - )-( + )( - - ) - + +ê úë û  
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0
21 1
2 1 1( 1) ( ) 1 ( ) 0
z
z z dz
g bb
g gs b b n+ ++ - + [ - + ] =ò ,               (88) 
where ct
* is determined by (77), kt
* is determined by (77) and (25’’), and(0)sr
*
is 
determined by (83). 
(v) The optimal stopping time is given by (86), where (0) 0k k= > , kˆ is given in 
(22) , andb is a solution of (88), where ct
* is determined by (78), kt
* is determined by 
(78) and (25’’), and(0)sr
*
is determined by (84). 
(vi) The optimal stopping time is given by (86), where (0) 0k k= > , kˆ is given in 
(22) , andb is a solution of (88), where ct
* is determined by (79), kt
* is determined by 
(79) and (25’’), and(0)sr
*
is determined by (85). 
REMARK. This theorem shows that different information structures lead to 
different endogenous times directly on the one hand and indirectly by leading to 
different utility-optimal and sustainable terminal path levels of capital stock per 
capita on the other hand. That is to say, information constraint is of crucial 
importance in determining the minimum time needed to “economic maturity”. The 
economic implication is that certain level of information would make the economy 
reach its “maturity” faster than other levels of information, and also certain kind of 
information structure would make the economy reach its “economic maturity” much 
faster than other kinds of information structure. Accordingly, Theorem 4 implies that 
the issue of information constraint consists of at least two parts: one is that the 
absolute quantity of information is nontrivial and the other is that the distributive 
functions of information among the agents are also of great importance from the 
viewpoint of economic development. All in all, this theorem provides us with an 
efficient mechanism to build a close linkage between the micro-information-structure 
and the macro-economic-development. 
 
6. LOCAL SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
In this section, we will make local sensitivity analyses of optimal consumption 
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strategy of the representative agent with respect to the initial level of capital stock 
per capita. And, in particular, we will take preference manifold one discussed in 
section 3 for example. In order to make local sensitivity analyses, some preparations 
should be firstly supplied. And, specifically, the following theorem and 
corresponding corollary are employed to prove our results. 
For any given Itô-Lévy process defined on the probability space ( , , )W  , 

0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ), 0,
(0)
dQ t t dt t dB t t z N dt dz t T
Q q
Jìï = + + Î[ ]ïïíïï = Îïî
ò

 ψ
 
Thus, the following theorem is established, 
THEOREM 5. (Representation Theorem for Functions of Jump Diffusions)20: 
Let :F   be a function with Fourier transform, 
 1
2( ) ( )
i xe x dxlpl
-F = Fò , l Î  
satisfying the Fourier inversion property, 
( ) ( )ie dlkk l lF = Fò , kÎ  
Then, 
( ) ( ) ( ) exp ( )q qQ t t dll làF = F {L }ò , 0,t TÎ[ ] 
where, 

0
( , )
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( , )
t t
q i s zt i q i s dB s e N ds dzll l lL + + [ - ]ò ò ò 
ψ  
{ }
0
2 2 ( , )1
20
( ) ( ) 1 ( , ) ( )
t
i s zi s s e i s z dz dsllJ l l n+ - + [ - - ]ò ò
ψ ψ , 0,t TÎ[ ]. 
Moreover, we have, 
COROLLARY 321. LetF be a real function as in Theorem 5, then we have, 
( ) ( ) ( )exp( ( ))qQ t i q t dll l lé ùF = F +ê úë û ò F , 
where 
{ }
0
2 2 ( , )1
20
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( , ) ( )
t
i s zt i s s e i s z dz dsll lJ l l n- + [ - - ]ò ò 
ψ ψF . 
                                                        
20 See Theorem 14.13 in pp. 259 of Di Nunno et al (2009). 
21 See Corollary 14.14 in pp. 259 of Di Nunno et al (2009). 
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Now, we begin our local sensitivity analyses. Firstly, inserting (29) into (26) 
produces, 
{ }
0
1 2
1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( , )
ˆ(0) 0, 0,
z
p p zdk t k t g g n b dt dB t N dt dz
k k t
ga a
gm r s s
t
-
+
ìïï = [ - - - + + ] - -ïïíïï = > Î[ ]ïïî
ò (89) 
And by (29), the optimal consumption strategy is given by, 
( ) ( )c t k trm= , ˆ0,t tÎ[ ].                                         (90) 
where ( )k t is determined by (89). Noting that m , s and zg are deterministic and 
suppose that 1zg e>- + for a.a. z , for some 0e> , and, 
0
ˆ
1 2 2 2
10
(1 ) ( ) ( )zp p zg g n b dz dt
t ga a
gm r s s n
-
+
é ù- - - + + + + <¥ê úê úë ûò ò ,    (91) 
By the Itô formula for Lévy processes, the solution of (89) is given as follows, 
{ 1 212( ) exp (1 )k p pk t k g g n b d ta am r s-= [ - - - + + + ]  
 }
0
1
10
( ) ln ( , )
t
zB t N ds dzgs +- +ò ò  
( )exp ( )qQ t ,                                            (92) 
whereb and d are defined in (8) and (17), respectively, and, 

0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )qdQ t t dt t dB t t z N dt dzJ= + +ò ψ ,                    (93) 
with 
lnq k ,                                                     (94) 
1 21
2( ) (1 )p pt g g n b d
a aJ m r s- - - - + + + ,                        (95) 
( )t s- ,                                                    (96) 
1
1( , ) ln zt z g+ψ ,                                                (97) 
If :h   , then by (90), 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) exp ( ) ( )k q qh c t h k t h Q t Q tr rm mé ùé ù é ùé ù = = = Fê ú ê úê úë û ë ûë û ë û    ,         (98) 
where 
 39
( )( ) exp( )h rmk kF  , forkÎ                                     (99) 
IfF satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5, then by Corollary 3, 
( ) ( )ln( ) ( )kd ddk dkh c t Q té ùé ù = Fê úë û ë û   
              ( ) exp( ln ( ))ddk i k t dll l l= F +ò F  
              ( ) exp( ln ( ))ik i k t dl ll l l= F +ò F ,                     (100) 
where, 
{ }11
0
ln1 2 2 21 1 1
2 2 10
( ) (1 ) 1 ln ( )z
t i
p p zt i g g n b d e i dz ds
gla a
l gl m r s l s l n+
-
+[ - - - + + + ]- + [ - - ]ò òF
                                                                (101) 
Noting that we focus on local sensitivity analyses, and without loss of any generality, 
we put, 
,
( ) ( )
M M
h r r
m m
k k
[ ]
 1 , with 0 M M< < <¥ .                         (102) 
which combines with (99) produces, 
( ),( ) exp( )M Mr rm m
r
mk k[ ]F  1 , kÎ                                 (103) 
and, 
 ( ) ( )1,2 ( ) ( ) exp( ) iii i iM Me d e d M Mr rm m
llrlk lk
m lp l k k k k
--- -
[ ]
F = F = = -ò ò  1 , (104) 
Substituting (104) into (100) leads to, 
( ) ( )12, ( ) exp( ln ( ))iiddk kM M c t M M i k t dr rm m
ll
lp l l
--
[ ]
é ùD = - +ê ú
ë û ò  1 F ,   (105) 
where ( )tlF is defined in (101). Moreover, by Di Nunno et al (2009)
22 we see that, if 
for some 0d> , 
( )
0
ˆ
2 2 21
10
1 cos( ln ) ( )z dz ds
t
gl s l n dl+
é ù+ - ³ê úê úë ûò ò ,                    (106) 
Then the integral in (105) converges. Therefore, the following theorem has been 
established, 
THEOREM 6. Based on preference manifold one introduced in section 3, 
if 1zg e>- + for a.a. z , for some 0e> , and (91), (106) are fulfilled, and also, 
                                                        
22 See pp. 262. 
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( ) exp(Re ( ))t dll l lF <¥ò F , 
Then we get, 
( ) ( )12, ( ) exp( ln ( ))iiddk kM M c t M M i k t dr rm m
ll
lp l l
--
[ ]
é ùD = - +ê ú
ë û ò  1 F , 
with ( )tlF given in (101). 
REMARK. It is well-known that sensitivity analyses have been widely applied in 
literatures of finance. Theorem 6 shows that this kind of analysis method can be 
naturally brought into macroeconomic analyses. And so by Theorem 6, we can tell 
the extent of the dependence of optimal consumption strategy on the initial 
conditions of the corresponding economical system. That is to say, we can show how 
much would the optimal consumption change for a given scale change of the initial 
conditions of the economical system. Most importantly, local sensitivity analyses can 
be applied to different preference manifolds corresponding to different endogenous 
times. Therefore, we have been supplied an appropriate variable instrument to tell 
the differences between different preference manifolds and hence different minimum 
times to “economic maturity”. Finally, we need to argue that different economical 
systems may share the same level ofD , while different levels ofD absolutely 
correspond to different economical systems. 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The major goal of the current paper is to determine the minimum time needed to 
reach “economic maturity” for an underdeveloped economy in the background of 
stochastic endogenous growth. And the major novelties can be summarized as 
follows: first, the minimum time to “economic maturity” and the sustainable and 
utility-optimal terminal path level of capital stock per capita are simultaneously and 
endogenously determined; second, the endogenous time can be explicitly computed 
in some conditions, specifically for the criterion or the preference of the modified 
Radner fashion, which will completely support comparative static analyses; third, 
two kinds of preference manifolds are simultaneously incorporated into our model 
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and the resulting different endogenous times are comparatively studied for the first 
time, which, in other words, implies that there may exist a one-to-one 
correspondence between the preference manifold and the endogenous time; forth, the 
effects of the endogenous time with respect to optimal fiscal policies and different 
information structures are thoroughly explored for the first time to the best of our 
knowledge in the background of general equilibrium framework; and fifth, local 
sensitivity analyses23 of the optimal consumption strategy with respect to initial 
level of capital stock per capita are incorporated into the unbalanced macroeconomic 
models. 
Finally, it would be clear that the methodology introduced here can be easily 
employed to compute the optimal stopping times in finance. Noting that a 
considerable number of literatures (see, Myneni, 1992; Shepp and Shiryaev, 1993; 
Hobson, 1998; Guo and Shepp, 2001; Avram et al, 2004; Choi et al 2004; Alili and 
Kyprianou, 2005) have been devoted to the issue of optimal stopping problems in 
finance, the advantage of the current method is that it will support the explicit 
computation24 of the corresponding optimal stopping times in certain conditions and 
therefore to further analyze the influences of other parameters, e.g., those reflect 
different financial institutions and different preferences of information structure, on 
the optimal stopping times. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
A. Proof of Lemma 1 
Applying the maximization operator in (11) yields, 
11
1exp( ( )) ( , ( )) ( ) (1 ) 0p s k p cg rs t V t k t k t g
a ar m t-- -- - + + + =  
1
1
exp( ( )) ( , ( )) ( ) (1 )
1
k p c
p s s t V t k t k t g
g r a ar m t-+ + - - = ,                         (A.1) 
Substituting (A.1) into (11) gives, 
                                                        
23 One can easily tell the differences between the method used here and those in empirical literatures, see, 
Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Canova, 1995; and Fernández and Rogerson, 1998. 
24 That is to say, a simple formula of the optimal stopping time can be derived in certain conditions. 
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2 21
2( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( ))t kkV t k t k t V t k ts- -  
( )
0
1 1, ( ) ( ) ( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( )) ( )
z z
kz zV t k t k t V t k t k t V t k t dz
g g
g g n+ +é ù- - - +ê úë ûò  
( )( )exp( ( )) ln ( , ( )) (1 ) 1s t k cs t e V t k trr m t+é ù=- - + + +ê úë û  
1 2( , ( )) ( ) 1k p kV t k t k t g n b
a am t s-+ [ ( - )- + + ] ,                     (A.2) 
Naturally, one can try, 
1 2( , ( )) exp( ( )) ln ( )V t k t s t C C k tr= - + [ + ] ,                         (A.3) 
for some constants 1C , 2C to be determined. Hence, by (A.3), 
1 2( , ( )) exp( ( )) ln ( )tV t k t s t C C k tr r=- - + [ + ] ,                      (A.4) 
1
2( , ( )) exp( ( )) ( )kV t k t C s t k tr
-= - + ,                              (A.5) 
2
2( , ( )) exp( ( )) ( )kkV t k t C s t k tr
-=- - + ,                            (A.6) 
Inserting (A.3)-(A.6) into (A.2) produces, 
( )
0
21 1
1 2 2 22 1 1ln ( ) ln ( )
z
z zC C k t C C dz
g
g gr r s n+ ++ + - +ò  
1 2
2 2ln ln ( ) ln (1 ) 1 1c p kC k t C g n b
a am t m t s-=- + - [ + ]+ [ ( - )- + + ]- ,  (A.7) 
which implies that, 
1
2C r
-= ,                                                    (A.8) 
And combining (A.7) with (A.8) leads to, 
( )
0
1 1 2
( )
1
1 2 1 11 1
2 1 1
ln (1 ) 1
ln ( )
c p k
z
z z
g n b
C
dz
r a a
m t
g
g g
r m t s
r
s r r n
- -
1+
-
- -
+ +
ì üï ï+ [ - - + + ]-ï ïï ï= í ï ï- + +ï ïï ïî ò
.            (A.9) 
Thus, it follows from (A.1), (A.5) and (A.8) that, 
1 ( )
ˆ 1
p c
s p g
r g a arm t- 1+= - - ,                                       (A.10) 
And by (A.3), (A.8) and (12), we obtain, 
ˆ1
1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ( )) exp( ( )) ln ( )V k s C k U
tt t r t r t-= - + [ + ]= .                 (A.11) 
where 1C is given in (A.9). ▌ 
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B. Proof of Lemma 2 
It follows from the “Integro-variational inequalities for optimal stopping” (see, 
Theorem 2.2, pp. 29) of Øksendal and Sulem (2005), we are to prove, 
(i) We need to prove that gf³ on D , i.e., 
1ln( )pCk g k
b a a-³  for ˆ0 k k< <                                 (B.1) 
Define 1( ) ln( )pl k Ck g k
b a a-- . By our chosen values of C and kˆ , we see that 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0l k l k¢= = . Moreover, noting that 2 2( ) ( 1)l k C k kbb b - -¢¢ = - + . Thus, if we put 
1b> , we get ( ) 0l k¢¢ > for ˆ0 k k< < , and also we have ( ) 0l k > for all ˆ0 k k< < . 
Notice by (14) that, 
1 2ˆ(1) 1 1 1 0p k c p sh g g r n b
a ar m t t s-=- + [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + <  
1 2ˆ1 1 1p k c p sg g r n b
a am t t r s- [( - )-( + )( - - )]< + - - ,         (B.2) 
Thus, (B.1) follows as long as (B.2) is fulfilled. 
(ii) Outside D we have 1( , ) ln( )s ps k e g k
r a af - -= and by (16), 
{ 1 1 ˆ( , ) ln( ) 1 1 1s p p k c p sg s k e g k g g rr a a a ar m t t- - -= - + [( - )-( + )( - - )]  
}212 0n b ds- + + + £    for all ˆk k³  
{ }1 212ˆ1 1 11 exp p k c p sg g r n b dpk g a am t t sa a r- [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +- - ³ , ˆk k" ³  
{ }1 212ˆ1 1 11ˆ exp p k c p sg g r n b dpk g a am t t sa a r- [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +- - ³ . 
which holds by (20). 
(iii) To check if tˆ <¥ almost surely. It is easy to see that one can choose parameters 
such that the geometric Lévy diffusion process defined in (7’’) satisfies the “At most 
linear growth” and “Lipschitz continuity” conditions, thereby implying a unique 
càdlàg (right continuous with left limits, i.e., RCLL processes) strong solution ( )k t . 
Then by (4), (8) and Itô formula, we obtain, 
{ }1 212ˆln ( ) 1 1 1p k c p sd k t g g r n b dta am t t s-= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +  
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          ( ) 
0
1 1
1 1 1( ) ln ( ) ln( ) ( , )
z
z z zdB t dz dt N dt dz
g
g g gs n+ + +- + + +ò ò   
{ }1 212ˆ1 1 1p k c p sg g r n dta am t t s-= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- +  
          
2
0
( ) 1
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ln( ) ( , )
zz
z z zdB t dz dz dt N dt dz
gg
g g gs n n+ + +
é ù- + + +ê úë ûò ò ò    
{ }1 212ˆ1 1 1 ( )p k c p sg g r n z dz dta am t t s g n-= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +ò               
0
1
1( ) ln( ) ( , )zdB t N dt dzgs +- +ò . 
Hence, we get, 
{( 1 212ˆ( ) exp 1 1 1p k c p sk t k g g r na am t t s-= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- +  
}
0
1
10
( ) ( ) ln( ) ( , )
t
zz dz t B t N ds dzgg n s +
ö÷+ - + ÷÷øò ò ò            (B.3) 
We see that if, 
1 21
2ˆ1 1 1 ( )p k c p sg g r n z dz
a am t t s g n- [( - )-( + )( - - )]> - -ò          (B.4) 
0zg <  a.s. n-                                                (B.5) 
And, 
0s< .                                                      (B.6) 
by the law of the iterated logarithm of Brownian motion, then we have, 
lim ( )
t
k t
¥
=¥   a.s. 
And particularly, tˆ<¥ almost surely. 
(iv) Noting from (22) that kˆ <¥ , thus ˆ0,k[ ]is compact set by Heine-Borel theorem. 
Accordingly,f is bounded on ˆ0,k[ ]via applying the fact that 2 2( )CfÎ  and the 
well-known Weierstrass theorem. So, it suffices to check that, 
1ln ( )pe g k
rt a a
tt
- -
Î{ [ ]}  is uniformly integrable on ˆ[ , )k ¥ . 
where denotes the set of admissible stopping time and the uniform topology is 
naturally induced by the norm, which is induced by inner product, of Hilbert 
space 2 ( , , )L W  . For this to hold, it suffices to show that there exists a 
constant M <¥ such that 
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2 1 2ln( ( ))pe g k M
rt a a t- -{ [ ] }£  for allt Î and ˆ( )k kt ³ .             (B.7) 
Since  
1 10 ln ( ) ( )p pg k t g k t
a a a a- -< [ ]<  on ˆ[ , )k ¥ . 
Hence, by (4) and (B.3), we have, 
2 1 2ln( ( ))pe g k
rt a a t- -{ [ ] }  
2 1 2 2( )pg e k
a a rt t- -£ [ ]  
{(2 1 2 1 ˆexp 2 ( ) 2 1 1 1p p k c p sg k z dz g g ra a a ag n m t t- -é= + [( - )-( + )( - - )]êêë ò  
}
0
2 1
10
2 3 2 2 ln( ) ( , )zn N ds dz
t
gs r t +
ùö÷- + - + ú÷÷øúûò ò  
{(2 1 2 1 ˆexp 2 ( ) 2 1 1 1p p k c p sg k z dz g g ra a a ag n m t t- -é= + [( - )-( + )( - - )]êêë ò  
} 
0
2 1 1
1 10
2 3 2 2 ln( ) ( ) 2 ln( ) ( , )z zn dz N ds dz
t
g gs r n t+ +
ùö÷- + - + + ú÷÷øúûò ò ò  (B.8)                
{(2 1 2 1 ˆexp 2 ( ) 2 1 1 1p p k c p sg k z dz g g ra a a ag n m t t- -é= + [( - )-( + )( - - )]êêë ò  
}
0
2 21 1 1
1 1 10
2 3 2 2 ln( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2ln( ) ( )z z zn dz dz ds
t
g g gs r n t n+ + +
ùö÷- + - + + [ - - ] ú÷÷øúûò ò ò 
                                                                (B.9) 
{(2 1 2 1 2ˆexp 2 1 1 1 2 3 2p p k c p sg k g g r na a a am t t s r- -é= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + -êë  
}
0
21
1( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( )z dz z dzg n g n t+
ùö÷ú+ [ - ] + ÷÷øúûò ò  . 
We conclude that if, 
1 ˆ2 1 1 1p k c p sg g r
a am t t- [( - )-( + )( - - )]  
0
2 21
12 2 3 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( )zn dz z dzgr s n g n+£ + - - [ - ] -ò ò  ,               (B.10) 
Then (B.7) holds and so does (iv). Specifically, from (B.8) to (B.9), we have used the 
following fact. For the following equation, 
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
0
( , )( ) ( ) ( 1) ( , )t zdX t X t e N dt dzy-= -ò , (0) 1X = .                  (B.11) 
which has the solution, 
{ }
0 0
( , )
0 0
( ) exp ( , ) ( , ) ( 1) ( )
t t
s zX t s z N ds dz e dz dsyy n= - -ò ò ò ò 
{ }
0 0
( , )
0 0
exp ( , ) ( , ) 1 ( , ) ( )
t t
s zs z N ds dz e s z dz dsyy y n= - [ - - ]ò ò ò ò   
(B.12) 
Suppose 
0
( , ) 2
0
( 1) ( )
t
s ze dz dsy n- <¥ò ò , 
Then by (B.11) we see that ( ) 1X t[ ]= and hence by (B.12) we obtain, 
 { }
0 0
( , )
0 0
exp ( , ) ( , ) exp 1 ( , ) ( )
t t
s zs z N ds dz e s z dz dsyy y n
é ùæ ö÷ç = [ - - ]ê ú÷ç ÷è øê úë ûò ò ò ò   
If we put 211( , ) ln( )zs z gy += , then (B.9) follows. 
(v) We need to prove that, 
(ˆ 2
0
ˆ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))k kk k t k t k t
t
f t f s fé + + -êêë ò   
0
2
1( ( ) ( )) ( ( )) ( )
z
zk t k t k t dz dt
g
gf f n+
ùö÷+ - - <¥ú÷÷ø úûò     for t" Î    (B.13) 
where ( ( )) ( )k t Ck t bf = withC given in (23) andb satisfying ( ) 0h b = in (14). Noting 
that, 
{ }1 2ˆ ˆ( ( )) 1 1 1 ( )p k c p s kk t g g r n b k t fa af m t t s ¶- ¶= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +               
2
2
0
2 21
2 1 1( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( )
z z
z z kk
k t k t k t k t k t dzf g g fg gs f f n
¶ ¶
+ + ¶¶
+ + [ - - + ]ò  
( ) ( ( ))h k tb r f=[ + ]  
( ( ))k trf= .                                         (B.14) 
2 2 2( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( )kk t k t C k t
bs f sb- = ,                               (B.15) 
And 
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0
2
1( ( ) ( )) ( ( )) ( )
z
zk t k t k t dz
g
gf f n+- -ò  
0
2 21
1( ) 1 ( ) ( ( ))z dz k t
b
g n f+= [ - ] [ ]ò ,                               (B.16) 
Consequently, given, 
0
21
1( ) 1 ( )z dz
b
g n+[ - ] <¥ò ,                                    (B.17) 
and via applying (iii), (B.13) follows as long as we show that 2( )k k t b[ ]<¥ almost 
everywhere on ˆ0,t[ ] . In particular, here we have 1b> by (B.2). Obviously, our 
following proof is similar to that of (iv). By (4) and (B.3), we have, 
2( )k k t b[ ]  
{(2 1 ˆexp 2 ( ) 2 1 1 1k p k c p sk z dz g g rb a ab g n bm t t-é= + [( - )-( + )( - - )]êêë ò  
}
0
2 2 1
10
2 ( 2 ) 2 ln( ) ( , )
t
zn t N ds dzgb b b s b +
ùö÷- + + + ú÷÷øúûò ò  
{(2 1 ˆexp 2 ( ) 2 1 1 1k p k c p sk z dz g g rb a ab g n bm t t-é= + [( - )-( + )( - - )]êêë ò  
} 
0
2 2 1 1
1 10
2 ( 2 ) 2 ln( ) ( ) 2 ln( ) ( , )
t
z zn dz t N ds dzg gb b b s b n b+ +
ùö÷- + + + + ú÷÷øúûò ò ò                 
{(2 1 ˆexp 2 ( ) 2 1 1 1k p k c p sk z dz g g rb a ab g n bm t t-é= + [( - )-( + )( - - )]êêë ò  
}
0
2 2 21 1 1
1 1 10
2 ( 2 ) 2 ln( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 ln( ) ( )
t
z z zn dz t dz ds
b
g g gb b b s b n b n+ + +
ùö÷- + + + + [ - - ] ú÷÷øúûò ò ò 
    {(2 1 2 2ˆexp 2 1 1 1 2 ( 2 )k p k c p sk g g r nb a abm t t b b b s-é= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + +êë  
}
0
21
1( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( )z dz z dz t
b
g n b g n+
ùö÷ú+ [ - ] + ÷÷øúûò ò  . 
Consequently, we show that if, 
1 ˆ2 1 1 1 2 ( )p k c p sg g r z dz
a abm t t b g n- [( - )-( + )( - - )]+ ò  
0
2 2 21
12 ( 2 ) ( ) 1 ( )zn dz
b
gb b b s n+- + + + [ - ] <¥ò ,               (B.18) 
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Then we get 2( )k k t b[ ]<¥ almost surely. ▌ 
 
C. Proof of Lemma 3 
Performing the maximization in (27) produces, 
1ˆ ˆ1
ˆ1exp( ( )) ( , ( )) ( ) 0p s c c
r r
k pg rs t W t k t k t g
a a
t tr m
-¶ ¶
- - ¶ ¶- - + + = ,            (C.1) 
1ˆ ˆ1
ˆ1exp( ( )) ( , ( )) ( ) 0p s k k
r r
k pg rs t W t k t k t g
a a
t tr m
-¶ ¶
- - ¶ ¶- - + + = .            (C.2) 
Noting by Lemma 1 and (25) that ˆ 0
c
r
t
¶
¶ ¹ and ˆ 0k
r
t
¶
¶ ¹ , so (C.1) and (C.2) becomes, 
1
1
exp( ( )) ( , ( )) ( )
ˆ1
k p
p s s t W t k t k t g
g r a ar m -+- - = ,                              (C.3) 
Substituting (C.3) into (27) gives rise to, 
2 21
2( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( ))t kkW t k t k t W t k ts- -  
( )
0
1 1, ( ) ( ) ( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( )) ( )
z z
kz zW t k t k t W t k t k t W t k t dz
g g
g g n+ +é ù- - - +ê úë ûò  
( )( )exp( ( )) ln ( , ( )) 1s t ks t e W t k trr m+é ù=- - + +ê úë û  
1 2( , ( )) ( ) 1k p pW t k t k t g g n b
a am s-+ [ ( - )- + + ],                    (C.4) 
If we choose ( , ( ))W t k t of the following form, 
3 4( , ( )) exp( ( )) ln ( )W t k t s t C C k tr= - + [ + ] ,                         (C.5) 
for some constants 3C , 4C to be determined. Then, 
3 4( , ( )) exp( ( )) ln ( )tW t k t s t C C k tr r=- - + [ + ] ,                      (C.6) 
1
4( , ( )) exp( ( )) ( )kW t k t C s t k tr
-= - + ,                              (C.7) 
2
4( , ( )) exp( ( )) ( )kkW t k t C s t k tr
-=- - + ,                            (C.8) 
Inserting (C.5)-(C.8) into (C.4) yields, 
( )
0
21 1
3 4 4 42 1 1ln ( ) ln ( )
z
z zC C k t C C dz
g
g gr r s n+ ++ + - +ò  
1 2
4 4ln ln ( ) ln 1 1p pC k t C g g n b
a am m s-=- + - + [ ( - )- + + ]- ,         (C.9) 
which implies that, 
1
4C r
-= ,                                                   (C.10) 
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And hence, 
( )
0
1 1 2
1
3 2 1 11 1
2 1 1
ln (1 ) 1
ln ( )
p p
z
z z
g g n b
C
dz
r a a
m
g
g g
r m s
r
s r r n
- -
-
- -
+ +
ì üï ï+ [ - - + + ]-ï ïï ï= í ï ï- + +ï ïï ïî ò
.              (C.11) 
Thus, by (C.7) and (C.10), (C.3) becomes, 
1ˆ1
p
p s g
g r a arm -- - = ,                                           (C.12) 
which combining with Lemma 1 shows that, 
0ct
* = .                                                    (C.13) 
Hence, by (25), we have, 
k pgt
* = .                                                   (C.14) 
And by (C.5), (C.10), (28) and Lemma 2, we obtain, 
1
3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ( )) exp( ( )) ln ( )W k s C kt t r t r t
-= - + [ + ]  
1
3
ˆˆexp( ( ))( ln )s C kr t r-= - + +  
 ˆU t= . 
where 3C is given in (C.11). ▌ 
 
D. Proof of Lemma 5 
(i) We need to prove that gf³ on region D , i.e., 
1 1
5ln ln( )
r
pCk k C g k
a ar- -+ + ³  for 0 k k*< <                     (D.1) 
Define 1 15( ) ln ln( )
r
pk Ck k C g k
a az r- -+ + - . By our chosen values ofC and k* , 
we see that ( ) ( ) 0k kz z* *¢= = . And, 
2 1 2
0 0
( ) ( 1) (1 )rk Cr r k kz r- - -
> <
¢¢ = - + -  , 
by (55) and (56). And using (55), we obtain, 
( ) 0 (1 ) ( )r rk r k kz *¢¢ >  - > ,                                   (D.2) 
where (0) 0k k= > and 5C is defined in (48). Thus, as long as (D.2) holds, we 
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have ( ) 0kz ¢¢ > for all 0 k k*< < , and also we have ( ) 0kz > for all 0 k k*< < . 
Therefore, (D.1) follows as long as (D.2) is satisfied. 
(ii) Outside of D , we have 1( ) ln( )pk g k
a aj -= , and by (39), 
1
0 ( ) ln( )pk g k
a aj r -=-  
{ }1 2121 1 1p k c p sg g r n b da am t t s- *+ [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +  
k k *" ³  
{ }1 2121 1 11 exp p k c p sg g r n b dpk g a am t t sa a r- *[( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +- - ³ ,      k k *" ³  
{ }1 2121 1 11 exp p k c p sg g r n b dpk g a am t t sa a r- *[( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +* - - ³ .        (D.3) 
Combining (42) with (D.3) shows that, 
( )1 2121 1 11 1 ( 1) 1(1 ) exp p k c p sg g r n b dp p sg g r a am t t sa a r r- *[( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +- - * - -- -  
{ }1 2121 1 11 exp p k c p sg g r n b dpg a am t t sa a r- *[( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +- -³  
ln(1 )p sg rr
*- - -  
1 21
2(1 ) (1 )(1 )p k c p sg g r n b d
a am t t s- *³ [ - - + - - ]- + + + ,        (D.4) 
Thus, (D.3) follows as long as (D.4) holds. 
It is easy to check that the remaining proof is quite similar to that of Lemma 2, 
so we take it omitted. ▌ 
 
E. Proof of Corollary 1 
Firstly, we introduce a Lévy process ( )Z t and denote by ( )Z sD the jump of ( )Z t at 
time s , i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )Z s Z s Z sD - - . Then, combining with the SDE defined in (60) 
shows that the corresponding Lévy process ( )Z t has the following Lévy 
decomposition, 
1 2( ) ( ) (1 )p pZ t B t g g n b t
a as m r s-=- +[ - - - + + ]  
       
0
( ) 11
0
( , ) ( )z Z sz
s t
N dt dz Z sgg {|D |³ }+
< £
+ + Dåò 1 ,                   (E.1) 
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where ( ) 1Z s{|D |³ }1 denotes the indicator function of the set | ( , ) | 1Z sw w{ ÎW; D ³ } . 
Moreover, we define a sequence of stopping times as follows, 
inf 0 | ( ) | 0m t k t mt { ³ ; > > } .                                   (E.2) 
Hence, it is easy to see that mt is increasing with respect to m , 
i.e., limm mt¥ =¥ almost surely. And we put, 
( ) ( ) ( )m
m mt m t
k t k t kt t tt
-
{ < } { ³ }+ - 1 1 ,                              (E.3) 
Then if we suppose that, 
0
2( 1) ( )z dzn <¥ò , 
And 
0
1( ) ( )
z p
z dz
g
g n+ <¥ò . 
for p" Î and 2p³ . We can apply Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 5.1 of Protter and Talay 
(1997) to produce, 
0
sup ( )m
p
s t
k s kt - *
< £
é ù
-ê ú
ê úë û
  
00
sup ( ) ( ) (0)m
ps p
p
s t
C k dZ k kt l l- *
< £
æ öé ù ÷ç ê ú ÷ç= - + - ÷ç ê ú ÷÷çè øë û
ò   
0
2 21 2 2
11 (1 ) ( ) ( )
z
p p zg g n b dz
ga a
gm r s s n
-
+
é£ + - - - + + + +òêë 
 
( )0
21 2 2
1(1 ) ( ) ( )
pp p z
p p zg g n b dz
ga a
gm r s s n
-
++ - - - + + + + ò   
0 1 0
( ) ( ) ( ) (0)m
T p pz p
pz dz k d C k k
g t
g n l l
- *
+
ù+ò - + -úû ò   ,           (E.4) 
where 0pC > is a constant depends on p , k
* is given in (54’). And noting that the 
right hand side of (E.4) is finite because ( )mk mt - £ <¥ , and by triangle 
inequality, 
( ) ( )m mk k k kt tl l- - * *- £ - - + , 
Thus, applying Gronwall’s lemma to (E.4) leads to, 
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( )( ),
0
sup ( ) 1 (0)m
p p
M T p
s t
k s k k kt - * *
< £
é ù
- £ + -ê ú
ê úë û
 Y ,                   (E.5) 
where, 
{ 02 21 2 2( ), 1exp ( ) 1 (1 ) ( ) ( )zM T p p p zM T g g n b dzga a gm r s s n- +é + - - - + + + +ò +êë Y
( ) }0 021 2 21 1(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )pp p z z pp p z zg g n b dz dzg ga a g gm r s s n n- + + ù- - - + + + + ò +ò úû  . 
with ( ) 0M T > and 0 T< £¥ . Noting that the right hand side of (E.5) is independent 
of m , so employment of Fatou’s lemma and Levi lemma gives the result in our 
theorem. ▌ 
 
F. Proof of Theorem 3 
The proof is the same as that of Corollary 1. Hence, combining with (58), we see 
that, 
 { 02 21 2 2( ), 1exp ( ) 1 ( ) ( )zM T p p s zM T g r n b dzga a gm s s n- * +é + - + + + +ò +êë Y  
( ) }0 021 2 21 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )pp p z z pp s z zg r n b dz dzg ga a g gm s s n n- * + + ù- + + + + ò +ò úû  ,  (F.1) 
where ( ) 0M T > and0 T< £¥ . So,( ),M T pY is an increasing function of sr* , which is 
itself an increasing function of ct by Lemma 4. Hence,( ),M T pY is minimized by 
sending ct to zero. And by the balanced budget constraint given in (25’), we see 
that k pgt = . Thus, substituting 0ct = into Lemma 4 shows that, 
11
p
s p g
r g a arm -
* = - - ,                                            (F.2) 
Inserting (F.2) into (F.1) gives ( ),M T pY defined in Corollary 1. And this completes the 
proof. ▌ 
 
G. Proof of Proposition 1 
By (66) and (63), we have, 
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2 11exp( ( )) (1 ) ( ) ( )H p cs t g k t t
a a
x xr m t G
-¶
¶ = - + - + ,                    (G.1) 
Thus, if the representative agent has incomplete information, the corresponding first 
order condition (FOC) is, 
ˆ| 0H tx x x
¶
¶ =[ ] =  ,                                              (G.2) 
Substituting (G.1) into (G.2) shows, 
2 11
ˆˆexp( ( )) (1 ) ( ) ( ) |p c ts t g k t t
a a
x xx
r m t G-
=
- + = [ + ]   
2 1
ˆ
1
exp( ( )) (1 ) ( ) ( )|
ˆ
p c ts t g k t t
a a
x xr m t G
x -
=+ [ + ]
 =   ,                             (G.3) 
Combining (G.3) with (64) gives, 

2 1
1
exp( ( )) (1 ) ( ) ( )|
( ) 1
p c t
s p s t g k t t
r t g a ar m t G-+ [ + ]= - -   ,                        (G.4) 
where, 
 ( ( ))( ) ( )sr tk t k t  and  ( ( ))( ) ( )sr tt tG G ,                             (G.5) 
with ( )sr t -H predictable. And hence (G.4)-(G.5) give the result in (i) of the 
proposition. Noting that the proof of (ii) and (iii) is quite similar to the above one, so 
we take it omitted. ▌ 
 
H. Proof of Proposition 2 
The proof of Proposition 2 proceeds as follows, 
(i) To prove that gf³ on region D . This proof is quite similar to that of Lemma 2. 
Hence, we argue that (i) follows as long as, 
1 2
01 1 1 (0)p k c p sg g r n b
a am t t r s- [( - )-( + )( - - )]< + - - ,            (H.1) 
(ii) To prove that outside D we always have ( , ) 0g s k £ for ˆk k" ³ . This proof is the 
same as that of Lemma 2. 
(iii) To check that tˆ <¥ almost surely. By (71) and Itô-Ventzell formula, we have, 
 { }1 21 02ln ( ) 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sd k t g g r t n b d dta am t t s- -= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +  
              ( )d B ts -- 
0
1
1ln( ) ( , )z N d t dzg
-
++ò ,                     (H.2) 
Hence, we get, 
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 { }1 21 020( ) exp 1 1 1 ( )
t
p k c p sk t k g g r n b d d
a am t t l s l-æç= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +çèò
          
0
1
10 0
( ) ( ) ln( ) ( , )
t t
zd B N d dzgs l l
- -
+
ö÷+ - + ÷÷øò ò ò ,               (H.3) 
It follows from Duality formula for forward integrals that, 
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
T T
td B t D dts s
-
+
é ù é ù- = - =ê ú ê úê ú ê úë û ë ûò ò  , 0T" >                 (H.4) 
And, 

0 0
1 1
,1 10 0
ln( ) ( , ) ln( ) ( ) 0
T T
t zz zN d t dz D dz dtg g n
-
++ +
é ù é ù= =ê ú ê úê ú ê úë û ë ûò ò ò ò   , 0T" >   (H.5) 
So, we get by Lebesgue monotone convergence theorem, 
0
( ) ( )d B ts
¥
-- <¥ò  a.e.                                      (H.6) 
And 

0
1
10
ln( ) ( , )z N d t dzg
¥
-
+ <¥ò ò  a.e.                              (H.7) 
Hence, by (H.3), we see that if, 
21
02n b ds- - -  
1 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sg g r ta am t t-< [( - )-( + )( - - )], a.e.                     (H.8) 
Then we get, 
lim ( )
t
k t
¥
=¥   a.s. 
And also, tˆ <¥ almost surely. 
(iv) Similar to that of Lemma 2, we need to prove that, 
1ln ( )pe g krt a a tt- - Î{ [ ]}  is uniformly integrable on ˆ[ , )k ¥ .           (H.9) 
By (H.3) we get, 
 22 ( )e krt t-é ùê úë û  
{ }2 1 21 020exp 2 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sk g g r t n b d dt
t a am t t s r-
é æç= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + + -ê çèêë ò
 55
       
0
1
10 0
2 ( ) ( ) 2 ln( ) ( , )zd B t N d t dz
t t
gs
- -
+
ùö÷+ - + ú÷÷øúûò ò ò ,               (H.10) 
So combining (H.10) with (H.6) and (H.7) shows that, if 
1 1 1 1 ( )p k c p sg g r ta am t t- [( - )-( + )( - - )]  
21
02n b dr s£ + - - - , a.e.                                   (H.11) 
Then (H.9) holds and so does (iv). 
(v) Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, we need to prove that  2( )k t bé ù <¥ê úë û almost 
everywhere on ˆ0,t[ ]with tˆ <¥ a.s. and1 b< <¥ . By (H.3), we see that, 
 2( )k t bé ùê úë û  
{ }2 1 21 020exp 2 1 1 1 ( )
t
p k c p sk g g r n b d d
b a ab m t t l s l-
é æç= [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + +ê çèêë ò
       
0
1
10 0
2 ( ) ( ) 2 ln( ) ( , )
t t
zd B N d dzgb s l b l
- -
+
ùö÷+ - + ú÷÷øúûò ò ò , 
Thus, applying (H.6) and (H.7), we find if, 
1 21
021 1 1 ( )p k c p sg g r t n b d
a am t t s- [( - )-( + )( - - )]- + + + <¥ , a.e. (H.12) 
Then (v) follows. ▌ 
 
I. Proof of Proposition 3 
The proof will be naturally divided into two parts. 
(i) Symmetric information: 
For instance, if both the representative agent and the government have complete 
information, then by (69) in Proposition 1, we get, 

2 1
1
exp( ( )) (1 ) ( ) ( )|
( ) 1
p c t
s p s t g k t t
r t g a ar m t G-+ + [ ]= - -   ,                         (I.1) 
By (75), (73) and (I.1), we see that, 


  ( ) ( )2 11
1 ( )
exp( ( )) ( ) ( )s s
c c cp s
r t r tH
pg r t
s t g k t ta at t tr m G
¶ ¶-¶
¶ ¶ ¶- -
=- - + + ,             (I.2) 
Since we have the following FOC, 
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 0
c
c c
H
tt t t*
¶
¶ =
é ù =ê úë û  ,                                              (I.3) 
which combining with (I.2) implies that, 

 2 11
1 ( )
exp( ( )) ( ) ( )
p s
t p tg r t
s t g k t ta am G*
**-
- -
é ù é ù- + =ê ú ê úê ú ë ûë û
   ,               (I.4) 
where  ( )( ) ( ) cs sr t r t
t**  ,  ( )( ) ( ) ck t k t t
**  and  ( )( ) ( ) ct t tG G
**  with ct* - predictable. Then, 
inserting (I.1) into (I.4) and applying the law of iterated expectation, 
   (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c t tk t t k t tt G G
* ** ** é ù é ù+ =ê ú ê úë û ë û
   ,                         (I.5) 
which yields, 
0ct
* = ,                                                       (I.6) 
Hence, by (25’’), we obtain, 
k pgt
* = ,                                                      (I.7) 
(ii) Asymmetric information: 
(ii-a) As usual, suppose that the representative agent has private information, that is, 
the representative agent has more information than the government. For example, the 
representative agent has perfect information while the government has complete 
information, then by (70) in Proposition 1 we get, 

2 1
1
exp( ( )) (1 ) ( ) ( )|
( ) 1
p c t
s p s t g k t t
r t g a ar m t G-+ + [ ]= - -   ,                         (I.8) 
And the corresponding FOC is given in (I.3). Thus, combining (I.2) and (I.3) with 
(I.8), we obtain by the law of iterated expectation, 
  (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
c c
c t t tk t t k t t
t t
t G G
*
***
=
é ùé ùé ù+ = ê úê úê úë ûë û ë û
     ,                  (I.9) 
   (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c t tk t t k t tt G G
* ** ** é ù é ù + =ê ú ê úë û ë û    
which implies that, 
0ct
* = ,                                                      (I.10) 
Hence, by (25’’), we obtain, 
k pgt
* = ,                                                     (I.11) 
Similarly, it is easy to show that (I.10) and (I.11) follow for other cases as long as the 
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representative agent gets more information than the government. 
(ii-b) Suppose that the government has more information than the representative agent. 
For example, the government has perfect information while the representative agent 
has complete information. Then the FOC is, 
 0
c
c c
H
tt t t*
¶
¶ =
é ù =ê úë û  ,                                            (I.12) 
Then combining (I.2), (I.12) with (69) given in Proposition 1, we get by the law of 
iterated expectation, 
  (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
c c
c t t tk t t k t t
t t
t G G
*
**
=
é ùé ùé ù+ = ê úê úê úë ûë û ë û
      
   (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c t tk t t k t tt G G
* ** **é ù é ù + =ê ú ê úë û ë û   ,                     (I.13) 
which gives the desired result. Noting that the proof of other cases is similar to this 
one, so we take it omitted. ▌ 
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